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## **Reserve Volunteerism**

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
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## **PREFACE**

This paper was prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) under a task entitled "Reserve Component Volunteerism." It discusses the extent to which Reserve volunteers can support national military strategy and suggests policy revisions to assure increased access to Reserve volunteers.

This work was reviewed within IDA by Wade P. Hinkle, Christopher Jehn, and James S. Thomason.

## CONTENTS

Executive Summary .....	S-1
I. Introduction.....	I-1
II. Background .....	II-1
A. Historical Experience with Reserve Volunteerism .....	II-1
B. Availability of Involuntary Callup Authority.....	II-3
C. Accession of Reservists for Military Operations .....	II-5
1. Domestic Operations.....	II-5
2. Major Regional Contingencies.....	II-6
3. Lesser Contingencies .....	II-9
4. Operations Other Than War.....	II-10
5. Summary .....	II-10
III. The Forms of Reserve Volunteerism .....	III-1
A. Individual Augmentation .....	III-1
B. Provisional Units.....	III-2
C. Rainbow Units .....	III-7
D. Volunteer Units .....	III-9
E. The Roles of Different Kinds of Reserve Volunteer Units.....	III-16
IV. Factors Influencing the Supply of Volunteers.....	IV-1
A. Willingness to Volunteer .....	IV-1
B. De Facto Volunteerism .....	IV-4
C. Reservists Who Volunteer .....	IV-5
V. Conditions for Using Reserve Volunteers .....	V-1
VI. Findings and Recommendations .....	VI-1
A. Findings.....	VI-1
B. Recommendations.....	VI-2
1. Congressional Support.....	VI-2
2. Department of Defense Actions.....	VI-3

C. The Future of Reserve Volunteerism .....	VI-11
Appendix. Persons Interviewed for the Report .....	A-1
References .....	B-1
Bibliography .....	C-1
Abbreviations .....	D-1

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Reserve military units and individuals are being used extensively in the post-Cold War era to provide capabilities absent or insufficient in the Active Components, and to augment or temporarily relieve over-committed active forces. Accessing reserve units and individuals to perform operational missions can be done in two ways:

- Involuntary active duty, which requires a Presidential decision, or
- Voluntary active duty, which requires willingness on the part of reservists to volunteer.

The two methods are complementary. If involuntary callup authority is available, it should be used, although reserve volunteers can also be used during an involuntary callup. If involuntary callup authority is not available, all reservists participating in an operation have to be volunteers. Involuntary callup authority is likely to be available for major regional contingencies, lesser contingencies involving combat, and some large operations other than war. For most operations other than war and peacetime support, including domestic operations, reserve participation depends entirely on reserve volunteers.

Cold War reserve accession policies were designed for a single, massive, involuntary mobilization of the entire Ready Reserve, and are unsuitable either for incremental, involuntary partial mobilizations or for extensive use of reserve volunteers. The DoD needs to establish new policies designed to increase the willingness of reservists to volunteer and to improve their utilization as volunteers. These new policies will provide a sound basis for planning for the use of reserve volunteers in future military operations.

To establish a framework for analysis, IDA established four models of reserve volunteer utilization: individual augmentation, provisional units, rainbow units, and volunteer units. To determine the effectiveness of those models, we studied six cases of reserve volunteerism for which about a hundred reservists were interviewed, including many junior enlisted personnel who had volunteered or indicated a willingness to volunteer. Those case studies were the primary basis for our findings about the four models.

- *Individual augmentation* is used to bring active and reserve headquarters and units to full strength for military operations. Reserve volunteers can be

solicited in advance to go on active duty when additional personnel with certain skills are needed to provide augmentation before involuntary callup authority is available for a major regional conflict or when involuntary callup authority is not available for other operations.

- *Provisional units* are formed by aggregating individual reserve volunteers into temporary units for specific missions. Provisional units can be ready to perform support tasks quickly in cases where unit cohesion is not central to mission success, or they can be formed deliberately for more complicated missions. Two provisional units were studied.
  - The 711th Postal Company was formed and staffed with Army Reserve Volunteers to provide postal service in Somalia in 1994. After two weeks for formation and training, the unit deployed to Somalia, serving there for six months. According to officials responsible for postal service in Somalia, the 711th did a good job.
  - The 4th Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, was formed and staffed with a mix of active component and Army National Guard and Army Reserve volunteers to serve in a peacekeeping operation in the Sinai Desert from January to June 1995. The 4th/505th was formed deliberately and went through an extensive training program lasting six months for officers and NCOs and three months for junior enlisted personnel. The battalion deployed to the Sinai in January 1995 and returned in June 1995. Official reports say that the 4th/505th performed its mission well.
- *Rainbow units* are formed by aggregating organized teams of volunteers from several units into a composite unit for a particular mission. One unit is usually designated to provide a core to which teams and sub-elements of other units are added. Rainbow units can be formed and deployed quickly for missions requiring teamwork and unit cohesion. One rainbow unit was studied.
  - The 175th Fighter Group, Air National Guard, was formed in 1994 and for sixty days flew combat missions over Bosnia from its base at Aviano, Italy. The Air Force uses rainbow units frequently to perform both training and operational missions.
- *Volunteer units* are formed by soliciting members of ordinary Guard and Reserve units to agree to volunteer in advance for active duty when asked to do so for certain purposes. Although there is no guarantee that all of the unit's members will report for active duty, volunteer units can provide an intact unit that can be filled to full strength by volunteers from other units. Three volunteer units were studied.
  - The 670th Military Police Company, Army National Guard, was asked to volunteer to be called up involuntarily to serve at Fort Drum, New York,

backfilling for active Army military police companies sent to Haiti. The 670th was in the Humanitarian Support Unit Program of the Army National Guard's Operation Standard Bearer, and the unit members had signed agreements that they would serve on active duty voluntarily for 45 days of active duty overseas. Although the Army wanted the unit for 90 days in CONUS, all of the officers, most of the NCOs, and many of the junior enlisted personnel lived up to their voluntary agreements. After several volunteers were disqualified for active duty, additional volunteers filled the unit to its mission strength. The 670th provided military police support at Fort Drum from October 1994 to February 1995 and was well-treated and highly appreciated by the troops and families at Fort Drum.

- The 258th Quartermaster General Supply Company, Army National Guard, was also in the Humanitarian Support Unit Program. All but two of the 94 trained members of the company had signed voluntary agreements, which they take seriously and say they intend to honor. Another 35 unit members had also signed voluntary agreements but had not yet completed initial active duty training and were ineligible to deploy overseas. Arrangements have been made for volunteers from nearby units to fill the 258th if it is asked to volunteer for active duty.
- E Company, 25th Marines, Marine Corps Reserve, served on active duty voluntarily for 30 days in 1994, providing relief for active component Marines responsible for securing the refugee camps in Guantanamo, Cuba. Although E Company was not designated as a volunteer unit, about two-thirds of the unit's members responded positively on short notice when asked to volunteer for the mission. The unit was filled to mission strength by volunteer reservists from other companies of the 25th Marines, and after a week of training at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, went to Cuba and did a good job there.

The case studies indicated that many reservists are willing to volunteer for active duty, but that some improvements are needed in the planning, processing, and employment of reserve volunteers. Problems we observed include a general lack of planning for obtaining volunteers and placing them on active duty, uncertainty about providing training for provisional units, multiple lines of authority for formation and processing of provisional and volunteer units, uncertainty about the duration of voluntary active duty, and delays in getting reserve volunteers paid promptly. On the other hand, in some cases the planning was good, and the units were formed with a minimum of difficulty. In all cases, the reservists accomplished their missions without difficulty.



According to the reservists interviewed for this study, their willingness to volunteer for active duty would increase if they were asked to serve short tours of definite duration with their own units to accomplish real missions. They are more likely to volunteer again and encourage others to volunteer if they are treated well and respected by active component troops and leaders while on active duty, and if they are not called on too often.

Present laws providing authority for calling reservists to active duty are adequate to support reserve volunteerism. However, use of reserve volunteers has been hindered in some cases by concerns about exceeding congressional strength authorizations and moving funds from one appropriation to another. The Congress could help by indicated a willingness to grant temporary relief from strength and grade controls and to re-program funds as necessary to support the use of reserve volunteers for operational missions.

To increase the effectiveness of reserve volunteerism, we recommend the Department of Defense take the following:

- **Define the requirement for reserve volunteers in advance.**

The reserve components need to know how many individuals and units of what types might be involved in planned or anticipated operations for which involuntary callup authority is unlikely to be available. These estimates will provide a basis for actions to meet the requirements and for determining the best ways to use the reserve volunteers.

- The Secretary of Defense should publish a DoD Directive specifying the circumstances under which involuntary call-up authority will be requested and, conversely, the circumstances under which reliance on reserve volunteers will be necessary.
- The Joint Staff and the Unified Commands should consider specific requirements for reserve volunteers and volunteer units in the deliberate planning process.

- **Make it easier to use reserve volunteers.**

- Develop a simple method of assigning operational missions for rainbow or volunteer units or for individual reserve volunteers.
- Investigate methods to accelerate unit training and development of unit cohesion in provisional units.
- Encourage each service to establish common personnel, promotion, and pay systems for all of its members of all components that will permit movement to and from active duty to be accomplished simply, rapidly, and fairly.

- **Provide adequate support for volunteer units.**
  - Allow commanders of volunteer units and intermediate reserve commanders flexibility to waive qualifications for entry upon active duty and for overseas deployment.
  - Assign volunteer units the highest priority for modern equipment and training support.
  - Authorize volunteer units sufficient trained personnel to meet operational readiness requirements, with an additional allowance for untrained personnel.
- **Test and improve the volunteer unit concept.**
  - Survey the attitudes of reservists toward volunteerism in general and volunteer units in particular.
  - At the next suitable opportunity, ask a reserve volunteer unit to go on active duty voluntarily for an operational mission.
  - Direct the CINCs to validate the readiness of designated volunteer units to provide a basis for measures to improve a unit or remove it from the volunteer unit program.

**Provide for the interests and morale of Reserve Components volunteers.**

- Ask the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve to establish a program to increase employer support for voluntary tours of active duty.
- Establish appropriate incentives for reserve volunteers and provide recognition for their active duty service.

The value of the Reserve Components depends not only on their readiness to augment the Active Components for major wars, but also on their ability to assist in smaller operations that occur frequently. The Reserve Components have capabilities that either do not exist or are in short supply in the Active Components. The Reserve Components have the capability to provide temporary relief for over-committed active component forces. The way to obtain these capabilities for military operations is to prescribe policies, establish procedures, and encourage attitudes designed to facilitate reserve volunteerism and increase the willingness of reservists to volunteer for active duty.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The Department of Defense (DoD) and the military services use the units and individuals in their respective National Guard and Reserve Components for a range of operations:

- domestic operations,
- operations other than war,
- lesser contingencies, and
- major regional contingencies.

The use of Guard and Reserve forces to augment and reinforce the active forces results from four related factors:

- Continuing and expanding U.S. commitments that require the use of military forces for a wide variety of missions;
- Declining defense budgets that reduce the capability of the active components;
- Force structures in which some capabilities exist only or almost entirely in the Reserve Components;
- Guard and Reserve forces that are ready enough to be employed on military operations after a short period of mobilization processing and pre-deployment training.

The confluence of these factors makes it highly desirable that the military services have adequate access to Guard and Reserve units, parts of units, and individuals when and where they are needed to bring active units to higher personnel strength (augment) or provide additional combat or support capability (reinforce). Access to reserves is adequate when units and individuals can be placed on active duty soon enough for a long enough time to participate effectively in an intended military operation.

There are two ways to access the Guard and Reserve Components:

Involuntary access is provided by ordering Guard and Reserve units, parts of units, and individuals to active duty without their consent. Involuntary access is obtained by the exercise of authorities that require Presidential or congressional action, including the Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC) Authority (Title 10, *U.S. Code*, Section

12304), Partial Mobilization (*U.S. Code*, Title 10, Section 12302), and Full Mobilization (Title 10, *U.S. Code*, Section 12301).<sup>1</sup> PSRC authority applies only to units and individuals in the Selected Reserve. Partial and Full Mobilization apply to the entire Ready Reserve, including both the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve.<sup>2</sup>

Voluntary access is provided by ordering individual members of the Ready Reserve to active duty with their consent by the use of Title 10, *U.S. Code*, Section 12301d.

This report focuses primarily on using reserve volunteers and secondarily on conditions for obtaining involuntary callup authority. The two methods of accessing reservists for operational missions are complementary. If involuntary callup authority is available, it is unnecessary to rely on reserve volunteers, except for some special circumstances where that may be desirable. If involuntary callup authority is not available, it is necessary to rely on reserve volunteers or forego their use for operational missions.

The objective of this study was to establish how best to assure voluntary access to guardsmen and reservists when they are needed for military operations. We provide answers to the following questions:

- What forms of reserve volunteerism have been tried, and how did they work?
- How can the willingness of reservists to volunteer be increased?
- Under what conditions is it appropriate to rely on reserve volunteers?
- What changes to law and to DoD policy and procedures will improve the ability of the military services to use reserve volunteers?

Our method was to consult appropriate historical, policy, and program documents; interview persons involved in the issue; and prepare case studies of six recent instances that bear on the use of reserve volunteers. The case studies provided information about the feasibility of reserve volunteerism under various circumstances. Information from the other sources helped us reach conclusions about when and how reserve volunteers should be used.

Chapter II of this report provides background information on the historical use of reserve volunteers, the availability of involuntary callup authority, and the role of volunteers in various kinds of military operations. Chapter III defines alternative concepts

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<sup>1</sup> In 1994, the Congress changed the numbering of sections of Title 10, *U.S. Code*, as follows: new Section 12301 was 672; 12302 was 673; 12304 was 673b; and 12301d was 672d.

<sup>2</sup> The conditions and details of involuntary access are covered in Reference [1].

for using reserve volunteers and presents recent case studies to illustrate their use. Chapter IV considers volunteerism from the perspective of the guardsmen and reservists being asked to serve by exploring factors that influence their willingness to volunteer, and Chapter V examines the conditions that should influence the decision to use Reserve volunteers. Finally, Chapter VI presents our findings and recommendations about what the Congress and the DoD can do to improve the situation.

## **II. BACKGROUND**

All of the military services employ Guard and Reserve personnel to perform operational missions either on training status or voluntary active duty. The Air Force uses Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve air crews to fly airlift and refueling missions. Army Reserve logistical personnel perform materiel management for repair parts pre-stocked in Kuwait, and Army Reserve and National Guard truck companies carry cargo to assist in relocating activities from bases being closed to their new bases. Naval Reserve intelligence units prepare coastal studies in support of the national intelligence program. All of these personnel are serving voluntarily, either in training status or on various forms of active duty, to perform operational tasks. This form of reserve volunteerism at the individual and sub-unit level occurs so frequently that the services take it for granted.

### **A. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE WITH RESERVE VOLUNTEERISM**

Voluntary active duty service by members of the National Guard and Reserve Components is neither new nor unusual. It has been the preferred method of gaining access to reserve forces for most of the nation's history. Since colonial days, volunteers have been used when legal and political problems made it hard to call up the militia. In the early wars of the 18th and 19th centuries, up to and including the Civil War, the states were responsible for raising volunteers. In the Mexican War, the reluctance of some governors to call up their militia for Federal service was overcome by mustering militia units and members directly into Federal service as volunteers. During the Spanish American War the states raised volunteers, but Congress also authorized the raising of several volunteer units from the Nation at large. The traditional method of accessing additional personnel for the Navy and Marine Corps was to rely on volunteers, initially from the merchant marine and fishing fleets, but later from organized reserve units.

For World Wars I and II, compulsory service was used both for the National Guard and Reserve Components and for new recruits. While many volunteered, including many reservists, the demands of the wars exceeded the numbers of military personnel that could be produced by volunteerism alone. In these conflicts the National Guard and Reserve Components were used primarily to provide cadres of trained personnel for the formation of new organizations filled out by draftees.

During the first half of the Cold War, from 1948 to 1968, reserve forces were called up to active duty involuntarily six times in response to wars or crises. Large numbers of reservists were called up to participate in the Korean War (1950), the Berlin Crisis (1961), and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). Smaller numbers of reservists were called-up for the Berlin Airlift (1948) and the Pueblo Incident (1968). The final reserve callup of this period was the token mobilization of 37,000 reservists in 1968 for the Vietnam War. The role of the Reserve Components during that period was to provide a second echelon that would require extensive resourcing and training after being mobilized. Because they were funded at low levels in peacetime, most reserve units took a long time to be ready after they were called. This lack of readiness proved to be disadvantageous.

During the second half of the Cold War, from 1969 to 1989, there were no involuntary callups of reserve forces, although small numbers of reserve volunteers were used to support military operations in Grenada, Libya, and the Persian Gulf. Guard and Reserve forces were used primarily for domestic emergencies and civil disturbances. To be able to support a conventional war in Europe, the Reserve Components received additional funds, personnel, and modern equipment, adopted Active Component training standards and methods (though at lower tempos of operation), and improved their readiness over that of the previous two decades. By the end of the Cold War, the Reserve Components were included in the war plans and time-phased deployment schedules to serve as the initial and primary backup for active component forces in a global war with the Soviet Union.

The end of the Cold War and subsequent reductions in the defense budget brought about a change in the role of the National Guard and Reserve Components in support of the national security strategy. The major feature of the new role was frequent and early use to augment and reinforce Active Component forces. Reserve units are scheduled to fill gaps in Active Component capability at the outset of military operations. Reserve individuals are now designated to bring active headquarters and units to full operational strength. Reserve units and individuals are used to replace Active Component forces that cannot sustain high operating tempos.

The new role of the Guard and Reserve in the post-Cold War era means that units have to be ready to deliver their design level of output when they are needed for employment under combat conditions. They also have to be accessible, and the military services need to be able to count on them.

Readiness is partially a cost problem, but it also depends on the amount of time reserve personnel can be available for training. Accessibility is a political problem. The ease and certainty with which a president will approve involuntary callup authority depends ultimately on the nature of the operation to be conducted and the acceptability of that operation to the U.S. population. If involuntary callup authority is not available, access to reserve units and individuals depends on their willingness to volunteer for active duty.

## **B. AVAILABILITY OF INVOLUNTARY CALLUP AUTHORITY**

The prevailing view in DoD during the final years of the Cold War was that an involuntary callup of the Guard and Reserve would be authorized only for a major conventional war with the Soviet Union. Other military operations would depend on active component forces with perhaps some small augmentation by reserve volunteers.<sup>1</sup> This was the case despite the enactment in 1976 of the Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC) authority, which allowed the President to authorize the involuntary callup of up to 50,000 Selected Reservists for a limited period of time. PSRC authority was intended originally to allow the President to access Selected Reserve units and individuals for a range of operational missions without having to declare a national emergency—an action thought by some to be unduly provocative in a tense international situation.

In the 1980s, however, increased emphasis on achieving a credible conventional option in Europe caused DoD planners to narrow the focus of the PSRC to its use during the early days of a major war in Europe. The number of reservists that could be called was increased to 200,000. DoD plans called for using the PSRC mostly to obtain reserve airlift, sealift, and port units to assist in the deployment of active forces to Europe before a larger reserve callup based on a national emergency or declaration of war would be available. By the end of the Cold War, DoD plans focused almost exclusively on using PSRC authority as a precursor to a full mobilization for a global war with the Soviet Union.

So when the United States found itself engaged in several small military operations in the final years of the Cold War, and thereafter, neither the services nor the Joint Staff thought to request involuntary callup authority. Although reservists were used for

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<sup>1</sup> According to Former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Special Assistant David Addington, that was the attitude conveyed to them by the military and civilian leadership in the Department of Defense at the time [2 and 3].



Grenada (1983), Libya (1986), and Persian Gulf tanker reflagging operations (1987), no request for PSRC authority was even contemplated. Small numbers of reserve volunteers participated in these operations on an improvised basis.

When President Bush decided in 1989 to intervene in Panama, operational planners in Headquarters, U.S. Southern Command assumed that PSRC authority would be available, primarily to call up Army Civil Affairs units that had trained for the mission. A request for PSRC authority was processed in the Joint Staff, but the Army opposed an involuntary callup and suggested the use of reserve volunteers instead. The request for PSRC authority never reached the Secretary of Defense or the President.<sup>2</sup> Yet, this episode reinforced the attitude in the Pentagon that obtaining involuntary callup authority would be difficult if not impossible because of the perception that a president would be unwilling to take this action.

Thus, most military and civilian leaders assumed that PSRC authority would not be available to support U.S. military operations after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 [4, Appendix A]. Actually, the involuntary callup of reserve units and individuals had been approved in principle by President Bush on 4 August when the initial discussions were held about U.S. military action. A PSRC request was prepared in the Joint Staff, coordinated, and approved by the Secretary of Defense and the President, effective 22 August 1990, 20 days after the invasion and 14 days after the decision to commit U.S. military forces to defend Saudi Arabia. This ready approval of a PSRC was difficult for some Pentagon personnel to believe. Although President Bush approved each request made by Secretary Cheney, doubts persisted in the office of the Secretary of Defense and the service staffs as to whether the President would approve the use the PSRC, extend the initial 90-day period of service for another 90-days, or authorize partial mobilization to extend the callup authority to the entire Ready Reserve and the period of active duty service to a full year. Delays in obtaining and extending access to the Reserve Components were caused more by uncertainty in the Pentagon than lack of political support.

After the Persian Gulf War, the PSRC authority was used more frequently than it has been before. PSRC authority was requested and approved for Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti (1994) and for peacekeeping operations in Bosnia (1995). It was also requested for reinforcement of Kuwait (1993) and would have been granted if that operation had been implemented fully.

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<sup>2</sup> A detailed account of the process of obtaining reserve callup authority for the Persian Gulf War is in Reference [4].

Experience since 1989 suggests that involuntary callup authority may be easier to obtain than previously thought possible. Involuntary callup authority was not available for the Panama or Somalia operations, but in those instances, the PSRC authority was not requested by the responsible combatant commander or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense was not asked to approve and send to the president a request for PSRC authority. On the other hand, PSRC authority has been approved in each instance when it was requested by the Chairman and sent by the Secretary of Defense to the President.

The best way to obtain involuntary callup authority (PSRC or partial mobilization) has been to ask for it. When military leaders have expressed a firm need for involuntary callup authority, political leaders have been supportive. The political leadership accepts that involuntary callup authority will be needed for a future major regional contingency. And there appears to be broader acceptance for using Guard and Reserve forces for small military operations than has been the case in past operational planning. This does not mean, however, that involuntary callup authority will be available for every future military operation. Many future operations and situations will require reserve volunteers.

### **C. ACCESSION OF RESERVISTS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS**

The method used to access reserve units and individuals varies according to the nature and circumstances of the military operations for which they are sought. If available, involuntary callup authority will be used; otherwise, volunteers will be used. The general availability of involuntary callup authority depends on which of the four major categories of military operations is being contemplated: domestic operations, major regional contingencies, lesser contingencies, and operations other than war.

#### **1. Domestic Operations**

National Guard and Reserve Component units and individuals are used often for domestic operations in response to natural disasters, technological emergencies civil emergencies, or terrorism. The role of military forces in these operations is to support civil authority and provide life-support, medical, and rescue services to the population during response operations.

Participation in domestic operations is frequent and routine for the National Guard, which operates in most cases as state troops under the command of their respective governors to deal with local emergencies. In some of these emergencies,

National Guard units and troops are called involuntarily to state active duty as prescribed in their state constitutions; in other emergencies, they serve voluntarily. During certain civil emergencies, National Guard units and individuals may be ordered into federal active duty involuntarily under the authority of Title 10, *U.S. Code*, Section 12406.

Federal reserve forces also participate in domestic emergency response, but to a lesser extent than the National Guard and entirely on a voluntary basis. Naval and Marine Corps reservists participate in domestic operations when their skills and personnel are needed locally. Most Coast Guard reservists participate routinely in domestic operations as members of their active Coast Guard units. The Army Reserve is expanding its role in domestic operations.

Participation by military forces (both active and reserve) in domestic operations tends to be short in terms of notice and duration. These operations are often in response to evident needs to save lives and assist people in the aftermath of disasters and emergencies. There is widespread community support for reserve participation in these operations, and there is no lack of volunteers to serve in them. Availability of funds is a greater constraint on reserve participation in domestic operations than a lack of volunteers.

Voluntary participation by guardsmen and reservists in domestic operations is working, and from the viewpoint of the national security strategy, is almost a trivial matter. However, domestic operations can benefit from policies and procedures to make it easier to volunteer.

In particular, it would be useful if some guard and reserve units of all of the services were pre-designated for rapid response to domestic emergencies. This pre-designation would permit units to train for rapid assembly and movement to an emergency scene and proper response actions thereafter. Most National Guard units receive some of this kind of training and preparation, but few reserve units do. While all military units may serve usefully in emergency response, support units that provide transportation, medical, engineer, supply, food service, mobile communications, and command and control capabilities are particularly useful. Pre-designation on a local or regional basis would improve the speed and effectiveness of reserve volunteers for domestic response operations.

## **2. Major Regional Contingencies**

The essential feature of the current National Security Strategy is readiness to wage two near-simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRCs). An MRC is a war limited to

a major region of the world between two nations, or groups of nations, one or both of which may be assisted by outside nations. For MRCs in which it becomes involved, the United States plans to bring overwhelming military power to bear rapidly in order to win quickly with few casualties. The emphasis is on a short-notice build-up in the theater of a large U.S. force to augment and fight alongside the forces of allies in the region.<sup>3</sup>

Guard and reserve units used in MRCs need to be available with certainty, and some need to be available quickly. Certainty can be provided by making prior arrangements for approval of involuntary callup authority (PSRC or partial mobilization) at the outset of the operation. Quickness can be facilitated by designating and preparing in advance the reserve units scheduled to be deployed in the first few days or weeks of the operations.

The issue of the availability of reserve units and individuals and their conditions of service for a particular MRC can be addressed in advance. Uncertainty about the availability and terms of service of reservists can be reduced by including provisions for requesting involuntary callup of reservists in the operational plans for potential MRCs. Approval of an operational plan would mean approval of the use of involuntary callup authority, and implementation of a plan would initiate a request to the Secretary of Defense and President for such authority. Each participant—the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders-in-chief (CINCs), and the leaders of the military services would know in advance whether involuntary callup authority would be requested and could plan accordingly. While presidential approval of an involuntary callup authority cannot be assured before the fact, prior approval by the responsible CINC, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense can.

Faster approval of PSRC or partial mobilization authority can preclude or at least minimize the gap between the initial demands for reserve units and individuals and the availability of involuntary callup authority. However, prudence dictates that plans be made also to rely on reserve volunteers to fill any gaps that may exist in the real operation.

Despite prior plans, it is possible that the President may disapprove or defer approval of a request for involuntary callup authority when an operation is implemented. The implementation of authority to call up guard and reserve units and individuals

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<sup>3</sup> The Persian Gulf War is the archetypal MRC for the current U.S. strategy. However, a future theater of operations might be less developed and less rich in host nation support than was the case in the Kuwait theater of operations in Southwest Asia.

involuntarily is a public act that cannot be concealed from a potential foe. (Prior approval of the callup request can be concealed, as can other aspects of the operational plan.) The reserve callup may be used to add to deterrence, or it may be delayed to avoid triggering hostilities. If the MRC has not started but appears imminent, the announcement of a reserve callup may precede the initiation of the military operation to show resolve and deter a potential foe from initiating hostilities. If the MRC has not started and negotiations are underway to forestall hostilities, it might be imprudent to call up reservists unless negotiations fail. In the latter case, it would be necessary to rely on reserve volunteers to bridge the gap between implementation of the plan and the availability of involuntary callup authority.

A hedge against an unexpected disapproval or a delay in the approval of involuntary callup authority could be provided by designating some of the reserve units and individuals needed in the first hours or days of an MRC as potential volunteers. Members of selected units needed to support the deployment of other units or needed early in the theater because of a lack of Active Component units could be solicited to serve on active duty voluntarily instead of involuntarily. If the volunteers are called up later involuntarily, their voluntary service would be subsumed into total active duty service.

Even when involuntary callup authority is available, some missions are better served by reserve volunteers. Some well-defined missions of known, short duration could be accomplished by volunteers who could go on active duty, do the work, and then be released from active duty. One example of this kind of mission would be the use of reserve volunteers during the first few days or weeks of a larger mobilization to provide installation and training support for mobilizing reserve units and for deploying units of both active and reserve components. Use of volunteers for this mission would allow them to be released once the units have deployed and they are no longer needed. This approach would allow the limited number of reserve personnel authorized by the PSRC or other involuntary callup authority to be used for missions of longer or indeterminate duration.

Reserve volunteers can also be used for cases where unit-level skills are unimportant, where there are many more qualified reservists than needed, and when many reservists would prefer not to serve. During the Persian Gulf War, some reserve attorneys and health care personnel were used on a voluntary basis to cope with sudden, temporary increases in workload or to provide short respites for overworked personnel in non-combat theaters. As with other applications, the use of reserve volunteers for these missions within the overall involuntary callup would benefit from effective planning.

### 3. Lesser Contingencies

Lesser contingencies constitute a set of potential military operations that involve combat but are smaller than major regional contingencies. The difference between lesser contingencies and operations other than war (OOTW) is that combat is likely in lesser contingencies, while in OOTW, combat is unlikely. An example of a lesser contingency is Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti, in which the threat of combat was real until defused by a timely intervention that allowed a peaceful entry. In operations other than war, military forces are used to achieve humanitarian or purely political purposes; in lesser contingencies, military forces are used to accomplish military missions—albeit to gain political ends.

Unlike the MRCs, for which involuntary callup authority would likely be granted swiftly and almost automatically, some lesser contingencies might have to be implemented without involuntary callup authority. The involuntary callup decision may not be made in advance, so there will be uncertainty at the outset about how to access reserve units and individuals for a specific operation. Much of this uncertainty can be resolved ahead of time by addressing the accession method directly during operational planning. In particular, the Secretary of Defense could consider and, if at all possible, specify the use or non-use of involuntary callup authority when directing a CINC to plan for a possible lesser contingency. For lesser contingencies, the Secretary of Defense can commit the DoD in advance to request involuntary callup authority but cannot similarly commit the President to approve it. (This is different from an MRC, for which it is reasonable to expect advance approval of involuntary callup authority by the President.) Thus, unless clear policy guidance is provided to resolve the uncertainties, the possibility exists that reserve volunteers will be needed for some lesser contingencies.

It would be prudent to make some arrangements in advance to assure that there will be sufficient reserve volunteers to provide the units and skills needed to support lesser contingencies. For example, estimates of the numbers and kinds of reservists that would be needed for a range of possible lesser contingencies would indicate how essential an involuntary callup authority will be to an operation. If requirements for reserve units and individuals cannot be met by volunteers, a decision must be made either to reduce reliance on reserves (if possible) or to make a strong case for involuntary callup authority.

#### 4. Operations Other Than War

Operations other than war (OOTW) is the name given to the set of operations in which the military services participate more-or-less routinely in the absence of a major regional contingency or a lesser regional contingency. Operations other than war include peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian assistance; foreign disaster response, counterdrug operations, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), and nation-building. OOTW are also called peacetime operations.

Involuntary callup authority is less likely to be requested for OOTW than for MRCs or lesser contingencies. Most OOTW do not involve the threat of combat (although fighting occurred in what started as a humanitarian assistance operation in Somalia). They are often small and of definite, often short duration. If protracted, they lend themselves to rotation of successive groups, each serving a short tour of duty.

Most OOTW can be planned for deliberately because the time and conditions for an operation, as well as the decision to proceed, are determined by the United States Government. This is different from planning for major regional contingencies or lesser contingencies, whose circumstances and timing are likely to be determined by others. One operation that does require rapid response is an NEO, but that kind of operation can be planned in advance and implemented upon need. Deliberate planning allows the CINCs to determine well in advance the numbers and types of reserve units and individuals needed and to make arrangements for the necessary reserve volunteers—units, sub-units, or individuals.

Generally speaking, OOTW provide the greatest opportunities for using reserve volunteers. Reserve volunteers can provide periodic, temporary relief for active forces that find it difficult to carry out an ongoing OOTW and also train for combat. Reserve volunteers can provide units and skills either not available or in short supply in the Active Components.<sup>4</sup> Reserve volunteers can provide units and individuals to perform tasks for which active forces cannot be spared because of other demands. In the process, these reserve volunteers can participate in actual military operations and gain experience and sharpen skills that contribute to their overall military value.

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<sup>4</sup> These include Civil Affairs units, Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare units, and Tactical Reconnaissance units [5].

## 5. Summary

Based on the foregoing discussion, an appropriate division between involuntary callup and voluntary use of reservists appears to be as follows:

- *Domestic Operations.* Reserve participation in domestic operations will be conducted entirely on a voluntary basis, except for National Guard troops ordered involuntarily to state active duty or federal service for civil disturbances, as discussed above.
- *Operations Other Than War.* Reserve participation will depend almost entirely on reserve volunteers because involuntary callup authority is unlikely to be available for these operations. However, some of these operations may be large enough to request involuntary callup authority.
- *Lesser Contingencies.* Reserve participation in these operations will usually be obtained by involuntary callup authority, but not always depending on circumstances. Lesser contingencies for which involuntary callup authority will be requested by the Secretary of Defense can be identified in the initial planning guidance for the operations. To the extent that involuntary access is not assured, plans will be needed to fill requirements for reserve personnel and units with volunteers.
- *Major Regional Contingencies.* Reserve participation in MRCs will be met primarily by reserve units and individuals that have been called up involuntarily. It may be necessary to rely on reserve volunteers to cover a time gap between initiation of the deployment and the approval of the involuntary callup authority, and it may be appropriate to use reserve volunteers to meet special needs during the involuntary callup period.

Before considering how to obtain reserve volunteers, it is useful to consider whether they are still needed. Involuntary callup authority seems to be readily more available than was once thought, and a policy of always invoking involuntary callup authority might be possible. Frequent use of involuntary callup authority for small operations might change the perception that this form of accessing the Reserve Components is particularly threatening. In this case, there would be no need for reserve volunteers.

However, a policy of always using involuntary callup authority could lead to problems with reserve recruiting and retention. Many operational requirements can be met by reserve volunteers serving on tours of active duty that are compatible with their commitments to families and jobs. The use of involuntary callup authority to meet requirements that can be met with volunteers increases unnecessarily the uncertainty and disruption in the lives of reservists. All reservists understand that they are liable to be



called up involuntarily for an MRC, but some do not want to go on active duty for smaller operations. Voluntary active duty service involves only those who choose to go. Routine, frequent use of involuntary access may decrease the satisfaction of reservists and cause them to leave military service.

In addition, calling-up reservists involuntarily still carries a political message, both internationally and domestically. Internationally, it signals a serious intention to conduct major military operations that might not be desirable in some circumstances. Domestically, it indicates that the situation is serious enough to cause reservists to leave their civilian lives even if they do not necessarily want to go on active duty. The political leadership may not want to send either of these messages for lesser contingencies or OOTW, especially if it does not have to.

Despite recent uses of the PSRC authority for the Persian Gulf War, Haiti, and Bosnia, it is unlikely that involuntary callup authority will be available for all future military operations. Reserve volunteers will still be needed. The next two chapters focus on how to assure that they will be available.

### **III. THE FORMS OF RESERVE VOLUNTEERISM**

Reserve volunteers may be used in a wide variety of forms ranging from a request by an individual reservist for a tour of extended active duty to the entry on active duty voluntarily of an entire military unit. For the purposes of this study, these forms of reserve volunteerism were grouped into four primary models: individual augmentation, provisional units, rainbow units, and volunteer units. The following descriptions include examples from among individual case studies of reserve volunteerism (Reference [6 through 11]).

#### **A. INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION**

Individual reservists are used to fill active and reserve units to required strengths, to replace losses, and to provide special skills.

An important reason for augmentation by individual reservists is to allow active headquarters, facilities, and support units to expand rapidly to handle a sudden surge in workload. At the first sign of an impending operation, military headquarters have to go on a schedule of 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. Facilities have to expand their capability to receive, process, train, and deploy both active and reserve units. Support units have to convert from peacetime concerns to wartime workloads, usually with additional personnel. Individual reserve augmentees make the difference between staffing levels established for peacetime operational tempos and emergency and wartime needs.

The Selected Reserve provides both organized units and trained individuals to the Active Components. While most of the attention is paid to organized reserve units, the contribution made by trained individual reservists is also important. About 50,000 Naval Reservists are assigned to augmentation units whose members will increase the operating strength of active Navy headquarters, facilities, and units upon mobilization. Almost all of the 8,000 members of the Coast Guard Reserve are individuals who augment active Coast Guard stations and headquarters. The Army currently has 13,000, the Air Force over 12,000, and the Marine Corps about 2,000 Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) designated to augment active headquarters and units upon mobilization.

Members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and retired military personnel can also provide individuals to augment Active Component headquarters and facilities and

support activities, as well as deployable units. These personnel may also be solicited to volunteer for active duty.

Operations for which involuntary callup authority is available may still require some individual reserve augmentees to volunteer for an initial period of active duty. Many individual augmentees are needed early, even before an operation is decided upon and announced. Reservists needed before final approval and public announcement of an involuntary callup will have to serve voluntarily at least until the involuntary callup authority is available and perhaps even after it is available. Augmentation of headquarters, facilities, and support units may be assigned a low priority by leaders concerned with allocating a limited number of reservists to be called up involuntarily. During Operation Desert Shield top priority was assigned to reserve units deploying to the theater of operations, with no spaces left over for "unessential" tasks. As a result, some facilities and headquarters in the continental United States (CONUS) had a hard time coping with the additional workload without the reserve augmentees that had been counted on to help out. It is quite likely that augmentation of active headquarters, facilities, and fixed support units by individual reservists will have to be done at least initially by reserve volunteers.<sup>1</sup>

The need for individual volunteers can be anticipated by arrangements made directly between individual reservists and the active units to which they are assigned for wartime duty. Active unit commanders can poll their assigned or earmarked reserve augmentees, establish lists of potential volunteers, and include those volunteers on the roster of persons to be called when needed. Reservists willing to volunteer for immediate active duty can make advance arrangements with families and employers to be absent on short notice. The list of augmentees willing and expected to volunteer to come when called can be revised periodically to allow all members of the reserve augmentation unit to share in this commitment.

## **B. PROVISIONAL UNITS**

Provisional units are temporary units formed just before or during a military operation to provide a capability tailored to meet the needs of a specific situation or a specialized capability that is not available in the permanent force structure. Provisional units are a general approach to meeting new or specialized needs and are not unique to

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<sup>1</sup> Retired military personnel are another source of trained individuals who may be accessed either voluntarily or involuntarily to augment active or reserve units, particularly to backfill vacancies caused by deploying personnel.

reserve volunteerism. Provisional units can be and have been staffed by active component personnel, reservists, retirees, civilian employees, and mixes of these.<sup>2</sup>

Provisional units have been used for many years by the military services, particularly the Army. During the Persian Gulf War, the Army formed several provisional major headquarters and other provisional units to meet its needs in Southwest Asia and CONUS. These provisional units were staffed with a mix of active component soldiers, IMAs, IRR personnel, retired personnel, and members of guard and reserve units.<sup>3</sup> All of the services habitually organize small units and sub-units to form mission-oriented task forces, but these are not provisional units. The Air Force favors the use of rainbow units, described in the next section.

#### ***Case Study: The 711th Postal Company (1993)***

The 711th Adjutant General (AG) Company (Postal) was one of four provisional postal units formed by the Army to support Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1993.<sup>4</sup> The 711th Postal Company was staffed entirely by Army Reserve volunteers, and the other three provisional postal units were staffed entirely by Active Component (AC) personnel.

The 129th AG Postal Company, an AC unit from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, provided initial support for Operation Restore Hope. Forty-two members of the unit deployed in December 1992 and served until February and March 1993. However, the 129th was a direct support postal unit designed to operate post offices, and it lacked the proper equipment and skills to perform the general support mission of receiving and distributing large amounts of mail to post offices. In addition, the 129th was the only active postal unit in the Army, and its personnel were already engaged in several other operations. The Army wanted to use a Reserve Component (RC) postal company to perform the general support mission in Somalia. After trying and failing to get an entire

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<sup>2</sup> A special form of a provisional unit is one for which the equipment has been procured and held for the unit, either in a unit set or depot stocks. Having the required equipment readily available greatly reduces the time to form and prepare provisional units for their missions. Some relatively simple units can be left unmanned until they are needed, and then assembled quickly using equipment on hand.

<sup>3</sup> The extensive use of provisional units by the Army in the Persian Gulf War is described in [12], particularly "The Case of the Unit That Was Not Called: The 377th Theater Army Area Command," "The Signal Support Dilemma: The 335th Signal Command," and "Combat Service Support."

<sup>4</sup> A full account of the formation and operations of the 711th Postal Company is in Reference [6].

postal company to volunteer for the mission more or less intact, a provisional unit was formed to be staffed by Army Reserve volunteers.

Two hundred fifty Army reservists responded to the call for volunteers sent out by the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC), Atlanta, Georgia. After screening for medical problems and skill qualifications, 5 officers and 43 enlisted personnel remained with the unit and deployed to Somalia in January 1993.

Lines of responsibility for forming the provisional postal unit were not clear. The U.S. Army Forces Command assigned the task to the XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, but it was hard to find an organization to do the job. The problem was that it was the first time that the post had to fill an AC unit with RC personnel. The 18th Personnel Group took the position that it dealt with AC units, and the 711th was a reserve unit. The Directorate of Reserve Component Support (DRCS) said that it knew how to receive, process, and train existing RC units but had no experience with an AC provisional unit staffed with RC personnel. Readiness Group Bragg was unaware of the action. After some discussions, DRCS agreed to form and train the unit, Readiness Group Bragg helped arrange training support, the 18th Personnel Group validated the 711th for its postal mission, and the Fort Bragg Mobilization Assistance Team validated the unit for deployment.

Responsibility for training the unit and developing some cohesion fell on Captain Tamara Dozier, the company commander. Captain Dozier had served for several years as the commander of the 320th Postal Company, and Army Reserve unit in Cincinnati, Ohio, and volunteered for the Somalia mission along with two other officers from the 320th. This provided the 711th a core of leaders who had worked together before. It took a major effort by USARC to assemble from depots and other Reserve units the equipment for the 711th, but Captain Dozier, made one up based on her experience with the 320th. No advice or assistance was provided on how to form a provisional unit and build cohesion, so the officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) of the 711th just did it.

After two weeks at Fort Bragg, the 711th was sent to Somalia, arriving there on 14 January 1993. About half of the unit redeployed back to Fort Bragg by the end of March 1993, and the other half remained until June, when it was relieved by the 43rd AG Postal Detachment, a provisional unit staffed with AC personnel. The 43rd Postal Detachment was formed at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and had the same problems with equipment, training, and building cohesion that the 711th had experienced.

Reports in the Pentagon were that the 711th had done a poor job in Somalia, but that is not the view of those in a position to observe its work. Major Nina Garcia, then Department of the Army Staff Postal Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Hardesty, Personnel Officer of the 10th Mountain Division, and Brigadier General Billy K. Solomon, Commander, JTF Support Command, all said that the 711th did a good job.

The problems encountered in the formation of the 711th Postal Company and the 43rd Postal Detachment for Somalia (and the provisional units formed for the Persian Gulf War) suggest that the Army does not have a standard procedure for forming, training, and promoting rapid development of cohesion in provisional units. Energetic action by the company commander and a few individuals in USARC and DSRC overcame general indifference and ignorance to get the job done.

Overall, however, the experience of the 711th indicates that provisional units are a useful way to make good use of reservists who volunteer for tours of active duty. If the equipment is made available, it is relatively easy to staff provisional units. By selecting the best-qualified personnel from a larger pool of volunteers, a provisional unit can be staffed entirely with fully qualified individuals.

The major disadvantage of all provisional units is that the personnel forming them are often strangers who meet for the first time when reporting to the unit for duty. It takes time for them to get to know one another and to learn to work together effectively as a team. Provisional units are commonly formed in urgent circumstances, and there usually is insufficient time for the team-building process to work completely before the unit has to start work. Team-building often has to take place while the unit is performing its function. The ability of military personnel to form effective provisional units rapidly can be improved at the individual level by applying the same standards of knowledge and performance to all components, and strengthened at the organizational level by teaching senior officers and NCOs how to form effective provisional units.

Although all provisional units are temporary, the time period available for them to form, train, and perform their mission has varied considerably. For example, the 711th Postal Company was allowed only 2½ weeks to assemble, process, draw equipment, train, deploy, and get into operation in a theater, where it served for about 6 months. By contrast, the provisional infantry battalion formed for a 6-month peacekeeping mission in the Sinai (the subject of the next case study) was allowed a year to get ready.

***Case Study: The Multinational Force Observers/Sinai Battalion Task Force  
(1994-1995)***

The 4th Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, was a provisional unit formed to perform 6 months of duty from January through June 1995 as part of the U.S. element of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission in the Sinai Desert.<sup>5</sup> This provisional infantry battalion was staffed with about 550 personnel, including personnel assigned from the active Army (20%) and volunteers from both the Army National Guard (72%) and the Army Reserve (8%). All of the active Army personnel were officers and noncommissioned officers, filling half of the leadership positions of the battalion. The National Guard provided the other half of the leadership positions and the bulk of the infantrymen. The Army Reserve provided personnel with special skills to support the infantry elements. The 29th Infantry Division, Army National Guard, initially was assigned the mission of providing all of the National Guard volunteers, but the lengthy period of voluntary active duty (9 months for junior enlisted personnel and a year for officers and NCOs) made it necessary to expand the recruiting base beyond the division. Ultimately, the battalion as formed included National Guard volunteers from 24 states. The officer and NCO cadre of the 4th/505th went through an intensive 6-month training program, during which the enlisted leaders all went to a formal leadership course. Three months before the unit was scheduled to deploy to the Sinai, the lower grade enlisted personnel were brought in, and the entire battalion went through unit training. The provisional battalion deployed to Sinai in January 1995 and returned to CONUS in June 1995, after which it was inactivated.

The mission of the 4th/505th Battalion in the Sinai was to observe and report violations of the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. This was the 28th 6-month rotation for an Army battalion. The battalion operated in a dispersed manner. Squads manned remote observation sites for 3 weeks and the spent 3 weeks in a base camp. Each squad went through three rotations in a 6-month tour of duty. This kind of dispersed operation placed heavy responsibility on the junior officers and senior NCOs, particularly the squad leaders. The work was demanding but also boring.

The 4th/505th completed its mission successfully [13]. Qualified RC soldiers did volunteer, and although morale declined as the novelty of the mission became routine, no serious problems arose. The pre-deployment training was effective, although long and not oriented enough to the specific peacekeeping mission. A family support group that

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<sup>5</sup> A full account of the formation and training of MFO/Sinai Battalion is in Reference [7].

was established did a good job. No performance problems were caused by the mix of AC and RC soldiers. In fact, except for the unit's high visibility due to its being a provisional unit staffed mostly by reservists, the 28th rotation was remarkably like those of the AC battalions.

The Army accomplished its purpose of preserving the readiness of an entire brigade that would otherwise have been involved in providing an AC battalion for the MFO mission. Active, guard, and reserve soldiers got to know and to respect each other. And the Army demonstrated that it was possible to form a provisional unit, staff it with a mix of AC and RC personnel, and use it for a demanding tactical mission.

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These two examples indicate that provisional units are a good vehicle for the use of reserve volunteers. By their nature, provisional units are composed of individuals from different units who need to be developed into a cohesive team. This accommodates those reservists who are willing to leave their existing units and respond to a call for volunteers. The Army's procedures and practices for forming these two provisional units were not very efficient, but they were effective, and each of the two RC volunteer units did a good job.

### **C. RAINBOW UNITS**

Rainbow units are temporary units formed by assembling subelements of permanent units to perform a particular mission. Rainbow units are built around the cores of existing units instead of assembled from unconnected individuals as are provisional units. Volunteers comprising teams, crews, sections, or even platoons are aggregated into a composite unit. By combining subelements that are already trained and experienced in their respective functions, rainbow units can become effective and cohesive sooner than provisional units, other things being equal.

The Air Force uses rainbow units routinely to perform operational missions for all of its components. Formation of a rainbow unit by the Air Force usually is a deliberate process involving long-term detailed planning. The process is based on standard operating procedures derived from years of experience and validated by current practice. If time is short, as would be the case for reaction to an MRC, the years of peacetime practice pay off in rapid, almost automatic formation of the units needed to carry out the mission.

Rainbow units are the customary method by which Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units perform the training and the operational missions for which they are



responsible. It is usual for a part of a reserve wing or group to be sent to another location for training, and the ease with which this is done belies the careful planning involved.

Rainbow units are well-suited for reserve volunteerism. By their very nature, rainbow units do not need to include all of a permanent reserve unit to be effective for a mission. Once the operational mission is defined, the resources needed can be quantified, and the process of soliciting and incorporating volunteers can be started. If one permanent unit cannot provide enough volunteers to do the job, other units can be brought in to the rainbow unit process until enough volunteers are obtained.

The Air Force typically gives mission-type orders to the Air National Guard or Air Force Reserve when forming volunteer rainbow units for operational missions. When the requirement is for a few air crews or part of a medical squadron, the mission may be undertaken by only one wing or group. More often, the requirement is shared among two or more wings or groups under rules established beforehand when the mission is assigned. The Air Force also provides full support and assistance to its Air Reserve Components for these operational missions.

#### ***Case Study: The 175th Fighter Group (1994)***

The 175th Fighter Group, Maryland Air National Guard, formed a Rainbow Detachment that from mid-July to mid-September 1994 flew operational A-10 missions over Bosnia as part of Operation Deny Flight.<sup>6</sup> In April 1994, the Air National Guard Operations Center asked the 175th Fighter Group if it would agree to form a composite squadron to perform the Bosnia overflight mission in July, August, and September. The active Air Force fighter squadron from Germany that had been performing the mission needed to go to Nevada for tactical training. U.S. Air Forces Europe asked Air Combat Command to provide a reserve unit to perform the mission for 3 months, and Air Combat Command passed the mission to the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, with the lead falling to the Air National Guard. The 175th Fighter Group started planning for the mission, coordinating with the Air Force Reserve organizations that had been designated to participate, and soliciting volunteers from within its own ranks.

The 175th Rainbow Detachment operated six of its own A-10 aircraft and six A-10s from the Air Force Reserve from Aviano Air Force Base, Italy. The overall detachment strength of 200 personnel was divided evenly between the Air National Guard

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<sup>6</sup> A full account of the formation and operations of the 175th Rainbow Detachment is in Reference [8].

and Air Force Reserve, and the two components shared in the leadership positions of the Rainbow Detachment. A core group of five persons, including the detachment commander and operations officer, remained in Italy for the entire 90 days of the deployment. All of these personnel were guardsmen or reservists on full-time active duty. The 175th Fighter Group provided two rotations of volunteers who served for 45-day tours, and three Air Force Reserve organizations provided three rotations of volunteers who served for 30-day tours. All of these movements and changes of volunteers went smoothly, primarily because they had been planned carefully and because the Air Reserve Components do this kind of thing frequently and routinely. The 175th Rainbow Detachment performed its air operations smoothly and effectively, including a live-fire mission flown by two of its aircraft as NATO retaliation for aggression by Bosnian Serb forces.

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The Army may find it easier to form rainbow units as a result of changes underway to increase the modularity of its units. Support units are being redesigned to stress independent operations at the section and platoon level and multi-function capability at the company and battalion level. This new approach will provide greater flexibility in tailoring and phasing support in a theater of operations, and it will also make it easier to form rainbow-type support units by aggregating subunits composed of reserve volunteers.

Rainbow units can become effective earlier than provisional units because a high degree of small-unit cohesion is likely to exist from the start in its respective subunit elements. To the extent that volunteers represent the bulk of a small unit, it is better to obtain cohesive teams, crews or sections from existing units than to gather previously unconnected individuals. The success of the 711th Postal Company was due in no small part to the happenstance that the company commander and, two company officers had worked together as a team for many months in the 320th Postal Company. The success of the 175th Rainbow Detachment was due in great measure to the fact that it was formed of subelements whose leaders and members had planned and participated in earlier, similar volunteer operations.

#### **D. VOLUNTEER UNITS**

A volunteer unit is a permanent unit in which all or most of the unit members have indicated in advance that they will volunteer for active duty under specified conditions. This is the most ambitious form of reserve volunteerism.

Skepticism is widespread about the likelihood of entire units volunteering. One of the main arguments made by those who oppose reliance on reserve volunteers is that volunteerism does not provide intact units. Evidence, admittedly anecdotal, suggests, however, that while it may be unrealistic to count on every member of a reserve unit to volunteer, most will—particularly the officers and NCOs.

One strategy for creating effective volunteer units is to designate certain units as “volunteer units” and call on them first when a need arises. The basis for this approach is the belief that reservists who are told ahead of time that they are members of a volunteer unit and are expected to volunteer will be more willing to volunteer than reservists who are given no advance notice. Those who choose not to agree to volunteer are likely to leave the unit and be replaced by others who accept the conditions of unit membership. As noted below, however, pre-solicitation of volunteers has not always been a requirement for obtaining large numbers of unit volunteers.

In an effort to respond positively to the need for volunteer units, the Army National Guard initiated Operation Standard Bearer in 1991. Standard Bearer is a program in which the members of designated units are committed to volunteer for active duty when asked. This obligation permits the units to respond quickly for operations for which involuntary callup authority is not available. There are two programs within Operation Standard Bearer. The Humanitarian Support Unit Program includes a total of 89 units, including 18 units whose members have volunteered to go on active duty within 72 hours after notification and serve for 45 days in a humanitarian assistance or foreign disaster response operation. The Operational Unit Program includes 55 high-priority units whose members have volunteered to go on active duty within 7 days of notification to provide initial, gap-filler support for a major contingency operation for which involuntary callup would be made available.

There has been much skepticism about the feasibility of Operation Standard Bearer. Claims by the Army National Guard that these units would fulfill their stated conditions with a high proportion of their unit strength have been met with disbelief on the part of the Army, the Army Reserve, and some officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).<sup>7</sup> The agreements signed by members of Standard Bearer units stating that they would volunteer for active duty under the stated conditions, are discounted as

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<sup>7</sup> This statement is based on discussion at meetings of the Accessibility Working Group and interviews with military officers and civilian officials in the Department of Defense. Only the National Guard expresses confidence in Operation Standard Bearer.

unenforceable contracts. The program has not been tested, and the conviction of the National Guard leadership that this program would deliver entire units of volunteers more or less intact has not been accepted. However, a sampling of the views of the members of some of these units indicates that most of them support this volunteer unit program and will volunteer when asked to do so.

***Case Study: The 258th Quartermaster Supply Company (1995)***

The 258th Quartermaster (QM) Supply Company, Illinois Army National Guard, is in the Humanitarian Support Unit Program of Operation Standard Bearer.<sup>8</sup> As of 7 January 1995, the unit was authorized 143 personnel and had 144 soldiers assigned. However, only 94 of those soldiers were trained and eligible for deployment for an overseas mission. The other personnel were ineligible because they had not completed initial entry training to receive a military occupational specialty (MOS) or were in transition for separation or transfer. All but two of the 94 eligible personnel had signed agreements to volunteer for 45 days of active duty upon 72 hours notice. While signing the agreement is not a formal condition of membership in the unit, it is understood by the members that this is a volunteer unit, and all of the new personnel who have joined since a new company commander took over in mid-1994 have signed the agreement to volunteer. These soldiers take offense at the notion that they would not honor what they regard as solemn contracts. The members of the 258th QM Company take these agreements seriously and say that they intend to live up to them when called upon to do so.

Even though almost all of the trained members of the unit would live up to their voluntary agreements, the 258th QM Company would still need fillers from other units to get to its full authorized strength of 143. This is because of the high proportion of soldiers who had not completed their initial entry training and were ineligible to deploy for an operation. In 1994, the company commander recruited a large number of reservists on a "split training option" to increase the unit strength, and these recruits—many of them students—took half their initial entry training during the summer of 1994 and the other half during the summer of 1995. When those recruits finished the second half of their split training, the deployable strength of the unit improved. If the 258th were asked to

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<sup>8</sup> A full account of a visit to the 258th QM Company is in Reference [9].

volunteer for an operational mission in the meantime, the Illinois National Guard arranged for enough volunteers from nearby units to fill the 258th to authorized strength.<sup>9</sup>

While the 258th QM Company would presumably be one of the first to be used in an operation other than war, it is a low-priority unit in the Army's scheme of funding. Guard and reserve units earmarked for one or both of the MRCs are assigned to the Contingency Force Pool (CFP) and are supported at higher personnel and equipment fill levels and have more maintenance and training funds than units not in the CFP. The 258th is not a CFP unit, so it has some outmoded equipment and problems with maintenance and training. The Army National Guard selected non-CFP units for the Humanitarian Assistance Program to avoid degrading overall readiness for MRC operations. Because MRCs are infrequent compared to peacetime operations, the 258th and the other volunteer units that will be used most have the lowest priority for support.

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Operation Restore Democracy provided an opportunity to see if Operation Standard Bearer would work. Three Army National Guard military police (MP) companies were asked to volunteer as units to perform law enforcement missions at Army posts whose active MP companies deployed to Haiti. Although the members of those units were ordered to active duty under involuntary callup authority (PSRC), in accordance with Army policy for this particular callup, they had to volunteer to be called. All three of these MP companies were in the Humanitarian Support Unit Program of Operation Standard Bearer.

#### ***Case Study: The 670th Military Police Company (1994-1995)***

The 670th Military Police Company, California Army National Guard, served on active duty at Fort Drum, New York, from October 1994 to mid-February 1995.<sup>10</sup> In 1993, the 670th had volunteered to join the Humanitarian Support Unit Program because the unit members wanted to be part of the action and to compensate for the fact that the unit had not been called up for the Persian Gulf War. At the time the unit was alerted for the Haiti mission, it had a strength of 164 personnel, 90% of whom had signed agreements

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<sup>9</sup> The problem of insufficient trained strength applies to all reserve units whether they are ordered to active duty voluntarily or involuntarily. Active Component units are authorized a trained strength, but the authorized strength of Reserve Component units includes both trained personnel and those who have not yet been awarded a skill designator. This difference in strength authorizations makes it difficult for reserve units of all kinds to meet readiness requirements.

<sup>10</sup> A full account of the formation and operations of the 670th MP Company is in Reference [10].

to volunteer for 45 days of active duty for a humanitarian relief mission outside of CONUS.

When the 670th was alerted for participation in Operation Uphold Democracy on 13 September 1994, 122 members of the unit were both qualified and had volunteered to serve for 45 days in Haiti, in accordance with their volunteer agreements. Three days later, when the unit learned that the active duty tour would be for 90 days at Fort Drum, New York, only 70 qualified personnel volunteered. About 40 personnel who were willing to volunteer were disqualified for a variety of reasons, including lack of branch qualification, mismatch with a skill specified in the unit manning document, medical problems, and other criteria designed more for deployment overseas than movement to another CONUS installation. (One cook was disqualified because she had braces on her teeth.) The 49th Military Police Brigade, parent headquarters of the 670th, obtained 55 volunteers from other military police units to bring the 670th to its mission strength of 125 personnel.

The 670th MP Company was well-received and supported by the authorities at Fort Drum since the 670th was trained as a combat support military police unit, it needed some additional training before it was ready to function at Fort Drum. Immediately after arrival, company personnel completed a 2-week course required of all military police personnel performing law enforcement at Fort Drum, qualified on their newly issued 9 mm automatic pistols, and completed New York state driver's training. After the initial training period, the MP provided community policing, motorized patrols, traffic enforcement, and security for special events. They performed professionally and were accepted and popular with the active Army personnel and families on the post. As the active Army military police units returned to Fort Drum from Haiti, the 670th MP Company phased out and returned back to California in three increments, the final increment leaving in February 1995. Despite the fact that the Army had changed the terms of the volunteer agreement by ordering them to active duty for 90 days instead of 45, and then extending the period beyond 90 days, the volunteers were determined to do their duty without complaint.

The use of volunteer units to provide MP companies to backfill at Fort Drum, Fort Polk, and Fort Bragg during the Haiti Operation was a success. Although the companies all had to be filled to strength from outside sources, each of them brought along a solid leadership group and enough of the original unit members to provide a cohesive unit that was ready to operate effectively right away.

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A 100% response to a call for volunteers may be too much to expect and in most cases will not be necessary. At any given time, some individuals will be precluded from volunteering because of circumstances, but a larger group of individuals *will* volunteer to serve. That is, it will be possible to obtain on a voluntary basis most of a unit without notice and more of a unit if preparations are made in advance for volunteering as a unit. If members know that they are subject to call, they can make advance arrangements with families, banks, landlords, supervisors, and other supporting institutions to be absent on short notice. They can also be prepared mentally. A reasonable conclusion is that designating volunteer units whose members agree individually to volunteer for active duty under specified conditions increases the likelihood that a cohesive reserve unit composed of volunteers can be obtained on short notice for certain kinds of operations.

***Case Study: E Company, 25th Marines***

In some cases, designating volunteer units in advance may not be necessary to obtain satisfactory results. From October through December 1994, the Marine Corps Reserve provided three reinforced rifle companies on successive 30-day tours of voluntary active duty to perform security for internment camps in Guantanamo, Cuba, for Haitian and Cuban refugees. The active units responsible for this mission were over-tasked and needed some relief to perform required training and recover a bit. Three Marine Corps Reserve rifle companies volunteered to go on 40 days of active duty for this mission without pre-designation and, for the first company, without any warning.

E Company, 25th Marines, Marine Corps Reserve, was the first of the three companies to volunteer.<sup>11</sup> The mission was assigned to the 25th Marines about noon on Friday, 26 August 1994, and 2 hours later, E Company had been tasked to provide a reinforced rifle company of volunteers ready to deploy on Monday, 29 August 1994. On Saturday morning, the members of E Company were assembled at their reserve center in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, briefed on the mission, and asked to volunteer. One hundred ten of the unit's 178 members volunteered to go on active duty, including all of the officers and most of the staff NCOs. After getting ready to go, the troops waited 3 weeks for administrative arrangements to be completed, and then moved to Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, for 5 days of processing and training. On 25 September 1994, E Company

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<sup>11</sup> A full account of the formation and operations of E Company, 25th Marines is in Reference [11].

arrived at Guantanamo, Cuba. Its deployable strength of 160 personnel consisted of 100 volunteers from E Company, 41 volunteers from other companies of the 2nd Battalion, 25th Marines, 6 marine Corps Reserve volunteers with special skills from outside the 25th Marines, 8 regular marines, and 5 Naval Medical Corpsmen (including 3 reserve volunteers).

The initial response of the regular marines already in Cuba was skepticism, but after a few days the reservists of E Company were accepted as fellow marines. E Company, 25th Marines performed its mission for the prescribed 30 days and was relieved by a reinforced rifle company of volunteer reservists from the 24th Marines, who were in turn relieved by a volunteer company from the 23rd Marines. The Marine Corps was able to provide a much-needed respite for its active units by having some of its reservists volunteer for a short period of active duty. The reservists of E Company were justifiably proud of their accomplishments, but they were not anxious to be activated again in the near future. One disruption every few years was viewed as enough.

The approach of the Marine Corps Reserve to this first use of volunteer units in the Marine Corps was matter-of-fact. The use of the reserve volunteers was not treated as a big deal. The Marine Corps Reserve just did it. This approach is in sharp contrast to the Army, which approaches each use of reserve volunteers as a new matter characterized by uncertainty as to how to proceed and the use of impromptu procedures established *de novo* for each callup. In this case, the marines did it for the first time as if they had been doing it all of the time.

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Volunteer units offer a useful approach for missions that require both a high degree of unit integrity and cohesion and deployment without a lengthy period of pre-deployment preparation. At this point, the degree of exposure to active duty that is appropriate for a particular unit is uncertain. The conventional wisdom is that designation as a volunteer unit should be "passed around" so that the burden is shared more or less equally among all of the units of the same type. One idea in this regard is that once a unit has been called up as a volunteer unit, it should be taken off the list of volunteer units. However, many members of volunteer units say that they like being in an "elite" unit and would like to stay on the list even after they have volunteered and served. They certainly do not want to be taken off the list before they have served. Reservists in functions that are not present or in short supply in the active components, such as civil affairs, appear to



flourish under a regime of volunteerism as long as they are allowed some flexibility as to when, where, and how long they serve.

Despite these initial successes, which lend credence to the concept of volunteer units, that concept has not yet been tested. Because the agreed-upon conditions of the Humanitarian Assistance Unit Program were not applied in the activation of the 670th MP Company, the unit needed considerable augmentation from other units, and its experience may be more compatible with the rainbow unit concept than the volunteer unit concept. Similarly, E Company, 25th Marines, also required considerable augmentation of the core unit. The operational experience discussed above and discussions with personnel involved in these cases and other units tend to validate the volunteer unit concept, but data are insufficient to make firm conclusions as to how to maintain such a program in the National Guard and Reserve.

The Air Reserve components are going beyond pre-designation of a few volunteer units to a force consisting entirely of reservists willing to volunteer frequently for operational support missions. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve already demand more participation from their members than do the other Reserve Components. The minimum participation requirement for Selected Reservists is 39 training days per year. Flying crews are expected to devote about 120 days per year to their reserve duties, and support personnel, about 65 days. In effect, the Air Reserve Components are converting themselves by a process of self-selection into semiactive forces that will be expected and prepared to volunteer often [14 and 15].

## **E. THE ROLES OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF RESERVE VOLUNTEER UNITS**

In this chapter, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of three kinds of reserve volunteer units: provisional units, rainbow units, and volunteer units. Each has its place in an overall policy for making best use of reserve volunteers:

- *Provisional units* can do the job in two circumstances. First, when individual skills are paramount and the training required to develop collective unit skills can be accomplished quickly, provisional units can be ready even with short notice (as the 711th Postal Company was). Second, provisional units can also be successful when adequate training time is available to develop the necessary collective unit skills (as the MFO/Sinai Battalion was).
- *Rainbow units* are suitable for most tasks—except perhaps for ground combat—even with relatively short notice. A core of qualified individual personnel already formed into cohesive subunits provides an adequate base for

rapid development of unit-level competence. The experience of the 175th Fighter Group is an example.

- *Volunteer units* can be available quickly to provide support for almost any military operation. The 670th MP Company and E Company, 25th Marines, performed well on short notice even though they required considerable augmentation from outside the unit itself. Volunteer units also can provide the cores of rainbow units.

## IV. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SUPPLY OF VOLUNTEERS

The supply of volunteers is the primary determinant of the success or failure of reserve volunteerism. The supply is driven by the willingness of the individual guardsman or reservist to volunteer.

The following discussion of the supply of volunteers is based primarily on interviews conducted during the course of this study with about a hundred reservists who have volunteered for active duty, ranging in grade from private first class to colonel (see the appendix). The evidence is anecdotal and does not provide information on the views of those who did not volunteer. However, it does provide the basis for some tentative hypotheses that can be tested by a comprehensive survey of the propensity of reservists to volunteer for active duty.

### A. WILLINGNESS TO VOLUNTEER

Discussions with reservists indicate that most of them are willing to volunteer for active duty under certain conditions. As many reservists point out, they are already volunteers. All of the members of the Ready Reserve volunteered originally for military service. Those in the Selected Reserve volunteered a second time to train with their reserve or (for IMAs) active units.

The primary factors affecting a reservist's propensity to volunteer for active duty are as follows:

- *Length of tour.* Reservists are more likely to volunteer for short tours of active duty than for long tours. Most reservists say they can serve away from their jobs and families for two weeks, and many would welcome the opportunity to serve on active duty for this period. Many reservists can arrange to get away for 30 days; some can be absent from jobs and family for several months; but only a few can volunteer for a year or more of active duty.
- *Frequency of tours.* Reservists are not likely to volunteer for several repetitive tours in a short period of time. Most reservists say they will volunteer enthusiastically for the first short tour of active duty, and some will volunteer for a second, but most indicate they would not volunteer repeatedly without a lengthy interval between tours. This means that it would be prudent to rotate

voluntary tours of active duty among the entire membership of a reserve component. This has the disadvantage of limiting the number of potential volunteers from a particular component but it has the advantage of spreading the burden evenly. As noted previously, the Air Reserve Components are an exception to this rule because they have established a self-selection process in which those who do not welcome frequent voluntary active duty tours are winnowed out.

- *Previous volunteer experience.* Reservists who have had a rewarding experience on active duty are more likely to volunteer again and encourage others to volunteer than reservists whose active duty tours have been unsatisfactory to them. The Marine reservists of E Company, 25th Marines were pleased by the way in which the regular marines accepted them as full members of the Marine Corps team. The warm support and professional respect accorded by soldiers and families at Fort Drum to the volunteers of the 670th MP Company helped make the reservists' sacrifices worthwhile and stimulated them to work hard. On the other hand, some of the Army reservists who volunteered for active duty in Operation Just Cause and Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada) expressed a reluctance to volunteer again because of the way they had been treated [16]. Many Army guardsmen and reservists report that they were treated poorly by Active Component personnel while serving on involuntary active duty during the Persian Gulf War. As a result, some of them left the Selected Reserve after being released from active duty.<sup>1</sup>
- *Conditions of service.* Problems with pay, promotion, and personnel actions have been a source of discontent for some reservists on active duty tours. Separate finance and personnel management systems for active and reserve components can cause delays and errors when reservists are placed on active duty. Members of the 670th Military Police Company had difficulty getting their records transferred from the reserve pay system to the active Army pay system [10]. Some Army reservists serving on active duty in Southwest Asia during the Persian Gulf War were unable to be promoted because of personnel policies that did not fit the circumstances [12]. In some cases, volunteers fared worse than those who were called up involuntarily because personnel regulations did not provide adequately for voluntary active duty. These administrative problems occurred at the start of the tour of active duty, and most of them were resolved expeditiously when noticed, but they are an unnecessary irritant to the volunteers who want to be treated the same as other service members on active duty.
- *Type of mission.* Reservists are more likely to volunteer for demanding missions in a theater of operations than for backfill or support missions in

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1 Reference [12] provides a view of AC-RC relationships as perceived by the reservists.

CONUS. Reserve volunteers want to be included in the main action. The MPs sent to serve at Fort Drum say they would have preferred to serve in Haiti because that would have meant they were respected as first class soldiers. One of the attractions of the 175th Rainbow Detachment for volunteers was that the mission to fly over Bosnia was real. Reservists do not want to volunteer for "make-work" jobs that could be done in other ways.

- *Unit integrity.* Reservists are more willing to volunteer if they can serve in their own reserve unit with their buddies. This is especially important to junior enlisted personnel, some of whom have said they volunteered to go on active duty with their unit so they could stay with their own squad or platoon and the non-commissioned officers and officers with whom they had trained. One of the reasons why the members of the 238th Quartermaster Company have signed up to volunteer is that they want and expect to stay together as a company when they go on active duty.
- *Acceptance of service by family and employees.* The most important factor affecting the willingness of reservists to volunteer for active duty over and above the minimum training requirement is the attitude of their families and civilian employers. Reservists say that they are more likely to volunteer for active duty if their spouses and employers are supportive and capable of carrying on without them while they are gone. On the other hand, if spouses oppose extra active duty and employers threaten their jobs or promotion prospects, they are unlikely to volunteer.

As demands increase on reservists to devote more of their time and attention to their military duties, opposition from families and employers is likely to intensify. At some level of participation, increased demands may cause family members or employers to oppose not only extra active duty but training and even membership, placing reservists in an intolerable position that generally leads to their dropping out of the Guard and Reserve entirely.

Although the practical effects of voluntary or involuntary active duty on families and employers are the same, there is less acceptance of voluntary active duty. Families and employers can accept, albeit reluctantly, that their reservists have answered the call of the President to serve the nation. Families and employers find it hard to accept that their reservists have volunteered to leave them and go off to some military adventure not important enough to justify a mobilization. For that reason, several reserve volunteers said they deceived their families and employers about the exact nature of their active duty. This situation must have an inhibiting effect on reservists who might otherwise want to take a few weeks off from the usual routine for the excitement of active duty.

Pre-designation of volunteers can ameliorate some of these problems. It allows individuals without supportive environments to select themselves out of the pool of potential volunteers. It allows others to prepare their families and employers for the notion that the possibility of having to volunteer is part of their reserve commitment.

## **B. DE FACTO VOLUNTEERISM**

Defacto volunteerism is the practice of retaining on active duty only those reservists who want to be on active duty. In an involuntary callup, all members of a reserve unit would be ordered to active duty, but in situations for which entire units are not needed, unit leaders could allow individuals for whom service would be a hardship to opt out. For many operations, including MRCs, all members of the units being called up will have to participate whether they want to or not. In some cases, however, reservists can in effect be allowed to volunteer to remain on active duty after being ordered to active duty involuntarily.

Although involuntary callup authority was available for Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, the Secretary of Defense specified that maximum use be made of reserve volunteers. This was interpreted by some of the Reserve Components to mean that only members who volunteered would be called up involuntarily. This is the opposite of de facto volunteerism, in which all are called up involuntarily, and the volunteers are retained.

Mixing the two methods of accession the way it was done for Operation Uphold Democracy confused some of the reservists and failed to provide a good reason for giving them a choice to volunteer. Having to volunteer for active duty made it hard for members of the 670th Military Police Company to placate employers and families for whom involuntary callup was a lot more palatable than voluntary active duty. Many reservists said they would have preferred to have been called up involuntarily because that would have allowed them to tell their employers and spouses that they had to go.

The 670th Military Police Company used a form of de facto volunteerism when it was phasing out of Fort Drum and allowed members with pressing personal problems to be released before others, who volunteered to stay longer. While meeting the requirement to maintain the grades and skills necessary to perform the mission, the terms of service were negotiated within the unit. De factor volunteerism could have been applied also at the start of the 670th's operation. More people were sent to Fort Drum than were really needed, and the smaller requirement could have been filled with de facto volunteers to minimize disruption to the lives of other unit members.

De facto volunteerism offers a way to reconcile the competing stresses on the reservist being asked to volunteer for active duty. All decisions to volunteer involve a degree of compulsion, ranging from pressure from peers to demands of superiors, and these kinds of compulsion are opposed by other compelling forces, such as the attitudes of spouses, families, and employers. These opposing forces cause stress that sometimes leads reservists to leave military service entirely. These stresses and their adverse consequences can be mitigated by de-facto volunteerism, in which reservists are allowed to exercise as much free choice as permitted by the circumstances. By removing most grounds for compliance by reservists, their families, and their employees, a policy of de facto volunteerism could also make it easier to obtain and use involuntary callup authority for smaller operations.

Company E, 25th Marines, applied a limited form of de facto volunteerism when it prepared for its mission in Cuba. Some of the reservists who had volunteered to go with the unit during the initial surge of enthusiasm and unit esprit had second thoughts later and were allowed quietly to opt out for good reason. Those who went said they bear no grudge against those who opted out because the reservists and the leaders recognize the compelling nature of some personal problems.

De facto volunteerism is similar to a liberal leave policy and works best when administered quietly at the small unit level as a strictly voluntary process. While it is not applicable to all involuntary mobilizations, its use under appropriate circumstances can combine the certainty of involuntary accession with the enthusiasm of voluntary service.

### **C. RESERVISTS WHO VOLUNTEER**

Reservists who volunteer for active duty tend to be those most attracted to active duty and those with the fewest barriers to going on active duty. Personnel who place reserve membership at the top of their personal priorities jump at the chance of going on active duty. Personnel who are self-employed, students, employed by the government or sympathetic companies, or are unemployed have fewer barriers to volunteering for active duty. Because of family or employment circumstances, many reservists may prefer not to volunteer, while remaining ready to serve when ordered to active duty involuntarily. This situation suggests that volunteers are not a cross-section of reserve membership but instead a subset of members who can be available because of their circumstances.

We found no evidence to support assertions that reservists who make themselves available for voluntary active duty are less capable than those who do not. Critics of

reserve volunteerism allege that voluntary active duty tends to draw "the wrong people," and even Guard and Reserve leaders refer, often affectionately, to frequent volunteers as "guard bums" or "career reservists." However, the members of the reserve units interviewed for this study who volunteered or agreed to volunteer were as capable as and more motivated than those who did not.

The common characteristic of reservists who volunteered for recent operations appears to be a desire to do their duty and a willingness to sacrifice to do that. Getting active duty pay did not appear to be a primary motivation for volunteering, and indeed many reservists suffered financial hardship as a result of their voluntary tour of active duty. Some sought an opportunity for adventure. Thus, the basic reasons for volunteering for active duty are much the same as those for joining a military service in the first place—adventure and doing something worthwhile.

Although we found reserve volunteerism to have been successful in recent applications, there are some practical limits to its use. The number of volunteers on active duty from a Reserve Component at any one time can be only a fraction of the total membership of the Reserve Component. And, large numbers of volunteers can be obtained only for relatively short periods of active duty. The impact of these limits can be reduced by changes in policy, but the inherent nature of the Guard and Reserve as part-time military forces is such that the limits cannot be transcended entirely without converting the reserve components into full-time military forces.

The present system, with the exception of the Air Force, tends to make it hard for reservists to volunteer for active duty and to negate their enthusiasm for doing so. Present DoD policies, rules, and procedures for accessing reserve units and individuals are the result of 40 years of accumulated changes made during the Cold War to support a massive, involuntary, simultaneous mobilization of the entire Ready Reserve. Many of these DoD policies, rules, and procedures need to be changed to not only make it easy for reservists to volunteer, but also to make the volunteers glad they did and willing to do it again.



## V. CONDITIONS FOR USING RESERVE VOLUNTEERS

Although involuntary callup authority is easier to obtain than previously thought possible, it need not be used for all future military operations involving reserve units and individuals. Involuntary callup authority is certainly going to be available for a major regional contingency and is likely to be available for lesser contingencies. However, involuntary callup authority is inappropriate for domestic operations except in situations where it is desirable to "federalize" the National Guard, and involuntary callup authority is neither necessary nor desirable for most operations other than war.

The two conditions that affect a choice between involuntary and voluntary accession of reservists are combat and supply of volunteers.

- *Combat.* If operations involve combat or other situations that put military personnel at extraordinary risk, involuntary callup authority is desirable. Danger of death or injury from military operations and enemy action is a condition of military service, and all of the volunteers that comprise the Active and Reserve Components of the military services know this. Except in a few special circumstances, however, active duty personnel are not asked to volunteer for combat duty and neither should reservists. It is the obligation of the government to order personnel into danger, not the obligation of the individual members to take themselves into danger.<sup>1</sup>
- *Supply.* If the supply of volunteers is estimated to be insufficient to meet the demand for reservists, either the operation must proceed with fewer reservists than desired, or involuntary callup authority must be invoked. For operations other than war and domestic operations, however, the supply of volunteers has generally been adequate. However, supply affects demand. If the number of volunteers will be insufficient to meet an initial estimate of demand, planners will seek other ways to do the job and reduce the demand for reserve volunteers to a level that can be met.

The supply of volunteers is affected by the characteristics of the operation to be conducted. In general, the supply of volunteers will be greater for active duty tours of

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<sup>1</sup> The use of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve volunteers to fly missions over Bosnia violates this principle. This exception may be explained by the fact that while the peacekeeping missions involved the possibility of combat, volunteers were not intended to engage in aggressive action.

short, definite duration that can be planned deliberately in advance than for active duty tours that are long or of indefinite duration that occur without warning. The supply of volunteers is also greater when the demand is small enough in proportion to the number of eligible reservists that the same reservists are not expected to volunteer repeatedly.

Operations of long duration can be accomplished by volunteers if the operations are small or can be performed by rotation. For example, enough long-term volunteers were available to staff two-thirds of an infantry battalion for a 6-month peacekeeping mission in the Sinai. And rotating groups of short-term volunteers have performed missions of several years duration, such as was done by the Air Reserve Components in Panama and the Army Reserve in Kuwait. Extended duration alone does not rule out the use of reserve volunteers.

Short-warning operations also can be accomplished by reserve volunteers if planning and preparation is adequate. It is advantageous to have an extensive period of preparation to form a provisional unit, assemble a rainbow unit, or process a volunteer unit, and this preparation period may be available for many operations other than war for which the decision, conditions, and timing of participation are made by the U.S. government. Some operations other than war and many domestic operations occur suddenly, but the needs of these operations can be met by volunteer units that are staffed, equipped, and trained for quick response. Volunteer units whose members are committed to report quickly when called are likely to respond faster than units that are called up involuntarily without special preparation. Lack of warning does not rule out the use of reserve volunteers.

Another issue that needs to be considered is the extent to which voluntary active duty provides for the integrity of a unit (company, squadron, or detachment) being called to active duty. This factor applies primarily to volunteer units. Rainbow and provisional units lack unit integrity when they are formed, but the degree of cohesion and the unit's effectiveness can be increased by good leadership and training during the preparation period.

Unit integrity depends on the extent to which an entire reserve unit can be brought to active duty and deployed intact. Ideally, an entire unit would report for active duty with all of its required personnel and equipment, trained and ready to deploy. This ideal is seldom realized because most reserve units (and many active units) do not have in peacetime all of their required personnel or equipment. They have to be brought up to strength after mobilization, and the integration of new people and new equipment slows

the process of preparing for deployment. Even if all of the personnel assigned to a unit report for active duty, the integrity of the unit is disrupted further by the application of personnel rules that disqualify members from active duty or deployment for medical reasons, skill mismatch, or lack of training. Although involuntary callup can guarantee that all of the assigned personnel will report for active duty, it does not guarantee that unit integrity will be preserved during mobilization processing.

Volunteer units cannot compel members to report to active duty when called, but they can provide a high degree of unit integrity. All of the officers, almost all of the NCOs, and most of the enlisted members of designated volunteer units say they will report for active duty in accordance with their volunteer agreements. At the very least, this kind of response provides a core of leaders who have worked together and can integrate rapidly the fillers that may have to be added to bring the unit to full strength. When volunteer units are staffed, equipped, trained, and prepared for pre-designated missions, they can provide an effective unit capable of being employed immediately. A unit composed of volunteers can be presumed to have the edge in enthusiasm over a unit composed partially of reservists who did not want to go on active duty.

Reserve volunteers can also be used to accommodate the practice of calling up only parts of units for particular operations. To live within strength ceilings for a theater of operations or for involuntary callup authority, force planners sometimes establish a requirement for only a subelement instead of an entire unit or headquarters. If involuntary callup authority is in effect, de facto volunteerism can be used to staff the subelement to go on active duty. If involuntary callup authority is not available, units tasked to provide subelements can staff them with reserve volunteers.

The difference between involuntary or voluntary accession of reservists boils down to combat and supply—both matters that can be addressed early in the operational planning process. These factors can be assessed in advance so that a decision can be made at the start of the planning process as to whether or not the CINC, Chairman, and Secretary of Defense will rely on reserve volunteers or request involuntary callup authority from the President. If a potential military operation does not satisfy these criteria to permit the use of reserve volunteers, planning for the operation will have to include a request for involuntary callup authority.

## **VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. FINDINGS**

The following are our major findings:

- Each of the military services routinely uses reserve volunteers on active duty to accomplish training and operational missions.
- Reserve volunteerism has worked well in all the cases we have examined.
- The circumstances in which reserve volunteers will be needed, and the magnitude and nature of the requirements, have not received adequate attention.
- No clear policy exists on when involuntary callup authority should be requested and exercised.
- Involuntary callup authority is likely to be available for MRCs and most lesser contingencies, reducing—but not eliminating—the need to use reserve volunteers in these scenarios. Involuntary callup authority might be available also for some large operations other than war.
- It will probably be necessary, and it is appropriate, to use reserve volunteers for domestic operations, most operations other than war, and some lesser contingencies.
- Rainbow and volunteer units can perform most missions that might fall to reserve volunteers. Provisional units of reserve volunteers can perform some operational missions effectively—particularly those not anticipated.
- Reserve volunteers should not be kept on active duty for extended periods of time. Long operations will require rotation of groups of volunteers.
- Three characteristics of military operations that inhibit the use of reserve volunteers are a high likelihood of combat, long duration, and large size.
- Filling the need for reservists voluntarily is more difficult if their identification, accession, preparation, and training have not been considered beforehand.
- The volunteer unit concept is a promising way of getting cohesive, nearly complete units under specified conditions, but it has not been tested.
- Administrative procedures for accessing and administering reserve volunteers are often cumbersome and ill-defined.

- Reservists have few incentives to volunteer and get little recognition when they do.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS**

Our recommendations are presented in two sections. The first suggests what Congress can do to support reserve volunteerism. The second addresses numerous specific actions the Department of Defense should take.

### **1. Congressional Support**

The Congress has an important and influential role in all matters pertaining to the National Guard and Reserve Components, including accessing them for active duty. With respect to reserve volunteerism, there is no need to amend current law. Authorities now in the law for bringing Guard and Reserve units and individuals to active duty voluntarily or involuntarily are adequate. Congress could demonstrate support for reserve volunteerism by indicating a willingness to waive strength, grade, and funding controls now imposed on the military services. This would allow the executive branch to plan on having adequate flexibility to place reservists on active duty for military operations.

Accessing reserve volunteers to active duty increases active duty strengths, often in excess of congressional authorizations. Possible violations of mandated strength ceilings may inhibit the use of reserve volunteers in future operations. Congressional controls on specific grades, such as general and flag officers, may inhibit the use of senior officers and NCOs who volunteer to meet operational requirements. An expression of the intent of Congress to allow waivers for temporary increases in strength or grades that occur as the result of voluntary or involuntary accession of reservists on active duty would mitigate this inhibiting factor.

Shortages of the right kinds of funds have in a few cases caused the military services to eschew the use of reserve volunteers to support military operations. That was the case for the Army when it wanted to use several reserve units to provide support in Somalia but lacked the right kind of funds to pay them and had to rely instead on overcommitted active units. The general problem is that unprogrammed costs for emergency operations often have to be taken out of current funds, and there is a lag before reimbursement is received. However, even when there are sufficient funds in a Service budget overall, the money is appropriated to different accounts, and it is difficult to move the money around. This problem affects the use of reserve volunteers because there is a perception that it is hard to move the money from reserve to active accounts or vice versa.

Congress could support reserve volunteerism by expressing its willingness to consider and act expeditiously on DoD reprogramming requests needed to assure proper funding for reserve volunteers being ordered to active duty.

## **2. Department of Defense Actions**

Present Department of Defense policy and procedures are often inadequate to support the effective and appropriate use of reserve volunteers. The extent to which this is true differs according to Service. The Air Force has developed a good system for using reserve volunteers routinely and frequently. Navy and Marine Corps policies and procedures for using reserve volunteers could be improved. The Army has poor policies and procedures for use of reserve volunteers, although at the working level the Army makes extensive use of them. Allowing for these differences, several cross-cutting issues provide a basis for making substantive changes in policy and procedures. These issues are discussed in the following subsections. The first policy problem is simply a lack of DoD-wide policy.

### **a. Establish a Policy on Use of Reserve Volunteers**

There is no consensus within the Department of Defense on the proper use of reserve volunteers. Each military service takes a different approach. Some of these differences are due to the unique nature of the mission and culture of a particular service, but many are based on perceptions of the role and reliability of reserve units and individuals that are no longer justified or relevant.

Part of the opposition to the use of reserve volunteerism has been based on uncertainty over availability of involuntary callup authority, and part has been based on lack of a clear understanding of when, where, and how volunteerism can be used. Some of those opposed to volunteerism apparently believe that making volunteerism work will reduce the chances of obtaining involuntary callup authority for major regional contingencies or lesser contingencies involving combat. It must be made clear to all that the two methods of accessing reservists are complementary rather than competitive, and that there are circumstances under which involuntary callup authority will be requested by the Secretary of Defense and, perhaps, even approved in advance by the President. It must also be made clear that reserve volunteers will be used for operations that do not justify requesting involuntary callup authority and to meet special requirements during an involuntary callup. The Secretary of Defense should publish a DoD Directive specifying the circumstances under which involuntary callup authority will be requested and,

conversely, the circumstances under which reliance on reserve volunteers will be necessary. Presidential review and approval of the policy directive would increase its value as a basis for planning future operations.

#### **b. Improve Knowledge of Reserve Volunteerism**

Our knowledge about reserve volunteerism is insufficient to provide a good basis for developing programs to implement policy. Until now, discussions of reserve volunteerism have been informed more by official positions or subjective biases than by objective analysis. Some studies, including this one, have been based on anecdotal evidence. Although the key element of this subject is the collective view of the reservists themselves, little data has been compiled scientifically on what they believe. There are a few informal surveys, but there is no comprehensive database reflecting the views of the reservists. Better information is needed on how to make reserve volunteerism work. To provide a satisfactory experiential base for developing effective volunteer programs, the DoD should undertake additional research as follows:

- Include questions on propensity to volunteer in periodic surveys of the Guard and Reserve performed under the aegis of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
- Find out what employers think about reserve volunteerism and increased use of reservists on active duty during peacetime.
- Determine the effects of increased use of volunteerism for domestic operations and operations other than war on readiness, recruiting, and propensity to volunteer.
- Establish the costs and benefits of increased use of reserve volunteerism, including tradeoffs with active duty strength and funding.
- Conduct and evaluate some tests of various forms of reserve volunteerism, or conduct real-time evaluation of ongoing cases of volunteerism as was done for the provisional battalion formed to serve in the Sinai. In particular, a test of the volunteer unit concept, as established in Operation Standard Bearer, would be useful.
- Consider the long-term effects of increased reserve volunteerism on the military services and their ability to carry out the national security strategy.

#### **c. Identify Requirements for Reserve Volunteers**

One of the problems with current reserve volunteerism is that there are few firm requirements for reserve units or individuals for the kinds of operations in which they

would most likely be used. This means that it is hard to do much advance planning or training, except for instances in which the reservists are used for ongoing missions.

The Joint Staff and the Unified Commands should consider specific requirements for reserve volunteers and volunteer units in the deliberate planning process. The numbers and types of reserve units and individuals needed to support a variety of operations should be identified. The mobilization and utilization of the 670th MP Company and the 711th Postal Company would have benefited from advance knowledge about the need for these units. Commanders and staffs responsible for operational planning need to specify reserve requirements so that the intermediate headquarters and the units can prepare for active duty—voluntary or involuntary.

The services need to develop methods for identifying the component of units in operational planning. The Army has developed methods for estimating requirements for operations other than war and for domestic operations, but those methods do not distinguish between active and reserve units. The Army's practice in the Persian Gulf War was to deploy all of the active units of a particular type that were available and then start on the reserve units. That approach may not be the best way to respond to future military operations. If specific operations cannot be forecast in advance, it would be useful to establish generic requirements for reserve assets as the basis for arranging individual augmentation and designating volunteer units. The Army National Guard did this when it set up Operation Standard Bearer, but operational planners in joint and service headquarters need to validate the accuracy of its estimates.

#### **d. Validate the Readiness of Volunteer Units**

If volunteer units are to be effective, they need to be identified and designated in advance of their volunteer status. The Army National Guard has done so for the units in Operation Standard Bearer. If volunteer units are to be employed by the Unified Command commanders (CINCs) in accordance with operational plans, the CINCs need to know the capability and readiness of these units to perform the missions for which they have been designated. The component commanders should periodically test and validate the readiness of volunteer units to fulfill their active duty commitments and report the result to the responsible CINC. This procedure will provide a basis for actions to improve a unit or remove it from the volunteer unit program.



#### **e. Simplify Assignment of Missions for Reserve Volunteers**

Procedures for assigning reserve volunteers missions need to be improved. Part of the problem is in planning for missions involving the use of reserve volunteers.

The Air Force and Marine Corps use the reserve command structure for passing operational missions to reserve units. When the Air Force wanted a rainbow unit for Bosnia, the Air Staff tasked the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve to plan, prepare, and execute the mission—with one of the two Air Reserve Components taking the lead. When the Marine Corps wanted a reserve rifle company for an operational mission, the orders were passed down the reserve chain of command to the company commander charged with the mission.

The Army tended to ignore the reserve chain of command and appeared unwilling simply to pass a mission order to the Director, Army National Guard, or the Chief Army Reserve. This may have been due in part to the fact that the Army has a multiplicity of commands and headquarters that all have something to say about reserve training and mobilization. The Active Army still commands the Reserve and coordinates the Army National Guard by means of a major command (Forces Command or FORSCOM), two high-level regional commands (the CONUS armies), a major planning headquarters (Third Army), and a host of installation commanders and assistance groups, all of whom are involved in planning and implementing a reserve mission. In addition, there are an Army Reserve Command with ten regional support commands and an Army National Guard Operations Center, which works with 54 separate state-level commands. The lack of a single chain of command makes it hard for the Army to plan and implement reserve missions. The Army should develop a simple method of assigning missions for reserve units and individuals.

#### **f. Standardize Personnel, Promotion, and Pay Systems**

Personnel, promotion, and pay systems for reservists differ from those for active duty personnel in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and (to a lesser extent) Air Force. Only the Coast Guard is seeking to achieve a common system with its integration of reservists into active units. Each service not only has separate systems for its active, reserve, and guard personnel, but these systems usually are not interoperable.

The reasons for separate, different systems are rooted in history and previous attitudes. Few of the differences are justified by legal requirements, and it should be

possible to persuade Congress to make legislative changes that would provide greater interoperability and integration without degrading the Guard and Reserve.

Because the focus of mobilization planning during the Cold War was on massive involuntary mobilization of the entire Ready Reserve, it is easier to process an entire unit that has been called up involuntarily than a single reservist who volunteers for active duty. There are even different databases for members of different components. Although the information in each is presumably much the same, a reservist entering active duty has to be entered into the active component data base as if he or she were a new member.<sup>1</sup>

Enlisted reservists have had difficulty being promoted while on active duty, either voluntarily or involuntarily. This problem does not apply to officers because recent enactment of the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act clarifies the relationship of active duty and reserve officers, so voluntary active duty treats both groups of officers fairly while maintaining their separate identity. Similar equal treatment needs to be established for enlisted personnel so that enlisted reservists on active duty can be promoted on a basis comparable to active component enlisted personnel.

Differences in personnel, promotion, and pay systems cause unnecessary work when reservists are brought to active duty and transferred from the Guard or Reserve systems. Because of difficulties in moving from one pay system to another, reservists called up to active duty often go for months without being paid properly.

As part of its overall program to standardize and modernize DoD management systems, each service should be encouraged to establish common personnel, promotion, and pay systems so that movement to and from active duty can be accomplished simply, rapidly, and fairly.

#### **g. Relax Rules for Deployment Disqualification**

Inflexible application of current rules for disqualifying personnel for deployment can turn away reserve volunteers who would be valuable to their units. The current, strict standards for deployability were established when manpower was plentiful and disqualifying trained personnel from a mission for administrative reasons seemed to make sense. Such strict standards may no longer be sensible for reserve volunteer units.

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<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant General William Reno, the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel during the Persian Gulf War, wanted to establish a single, common database for all Army personnel in which the sole difference among the components would be an entry in a single data field. He was unable to get this idea accepted because of bureaucratic inertia and resistance.

While individual reasons for disqualification may have some merit, the collective application of all of the administrative rules for disqualification does not always make sense. In particular, it does not make sense to turn away reserve volunteers who can contribute to mission accomplishment despite having a skill code or grade not matching the unit manning document. Like their active duty counterparts, reserve unit commanders are well aware of the strengths, weaknesses, and qualifications of their troops and should be allowed flexibility to decide who can go on active duty and who cannot. The current practice of reserving that authority to one or (more often) several outside groups is damaging to unit integrity and discouraging for volunteers who are disqualified. The services should be asked to review their rules for pre-deployment disqualification and to allow reserve unit commanders and intermediate commanders greater flexibility to waive strict application of those rules for volunteer units.

#### **h. Authorize Trained Strength for Volunteer Units**

The ability of Reserve Components to provide effective units upon mobilization is degraded by the current practice that includes both trained and untrained personnel within authorized unit strength. The authorized strength of active units includes only trained personnel who have completed initial entry training and have been awarded a skill code. In the Active Components, recruits who have not completed their initial entry training are assigned to the (non-unit) personnel accounts as trainees or students. In the Reserve Components, however, untrained recruits are assigned to the units, and there is no separate account for trainees or students.

This failure to distinguish between trained (deployable) reservists and untrained (non-deployable) reservists tends to overstate the actual readiness of reserve units. The 258th QM Company was unready in terms of its authorized strength, despite the fact that almost all of its trained personnel were ready and willing to volunteer for active duty. When a reserve unit that is at full-strength cannot deliver a full-strength unit for active duty, the fault is in the strength accounting system and not the unit.

If volunteer units are to be relied on for operations other than war and domestic operations, they need to be authorized enough trained strength to accomplish their missions. For these units, untrained personnel should be authorized over and above the trained strength so that the unit can enter active duty at its authorized trained strength. This will reduce the necessity for filling volunteer units from other units and reduce the time needed to put effective volunteer units in the field. DoD should authorize volunteer units sufficient trained personnel to meet their operational readiness requirements, with an

additional allowance for untrained personnel sufficient to maintain the authorized trained strength.

**i. Treat Volunteer Units as High-Priority Units**

Reserve component units that are slated to be used early in an MRC have higher priority than other reserve units for equipment and other resources. Since volunteer units are more likely to be called than any other units, they should receive similar priority. DoD should assure that volunteer units receive the highest priority for modern equipment and other resources. One way that this could be done is to permit or encourage high-priority MRC units to be designated as volunteer units.

**j. Develop Ways To Facilitate Training of Provisional Units**

The development of unit cohesion and unit-level skills can be a problem for volunteer units, particularly for provisional units. Although the 711th Postal Company deployed quickly and performed well, its training was not planned well. Some degradation of unit cohesion occurs in all cases when units are brought on active duty, processed for deployment, and tailored for a mission. It happens to reserve units called up involuntarily and to active units alerted for deployment. It happens to all provisional units, whether staffed by active component personnel, by reservists called up involuntarily, reserve volunteers, civilian employees, or by a mix of personnel. So it would be useful to develop general principles and procedures that could be applied to accelerate the development of unit-level skills and cohesion. DoD should investigate methods to accelerate development of unit-level skills and unit cohesion in provisional units.

**k. Build Employer Support for Volunteerism**

One of the most valuable programs for the Guard and Reserve is the "grass roots" apparatus of local and state committees headed by the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR). The objective of NCESGR is to obtain support from business leaders and managers at all levels for their employees who are members of the Reserve Components. This support has focused in the past on acceptance of membership and tolerance for annual training and active duty for training, which takes employees' away from their jobs for two weeks or more each year. NCESGR also encourages employers to pay all or part of the employee's pay while the reservist is on annual training or active duty for training. The NCESGR effort is necessary because, despite laws that forbid employers from discriminating against employees who are or want

to be members of the reserve components, the attitudes of the employers are what really matters.

NCESGR and the individual Services and Reserve Components act to convince employers that it is not only good business but also their patriotic duty to support the Guard and Reserve. The committee is headed by a prominent business executive, includes senior business and government leaders, and meets periodically to assess conditions and review policies and programs. Most of the work is performed by state and local committees composed of military leaders, local businessmen, and other influential persons. Supported by a national staff, these volunteers pursue an agenda of meetings, visits, publications, and media events that pursue the theme of support for the Guard and Reserve. The organization also works to resolve problems and disputes between employees and reservists and to provide information to reservists on their legal rights. The national committee staff has an ombudsman available on a toll-free number to answer questions and refer problems for solution. For years, the Advertising Council has sponsored public service announcements on radio and television to encourage public and employer support for the Guard and Reserve.

The role of the NCESGR should be expanded to include the subject of employer support for voluntary tours of active duty. The current program has been successful in building employer support for training absences and involuntary active duty (such as Operation Desert Storm). If volunteerism is to succeed, however, employers of reservists must be willing to go beyond the mere requirements of the law. NCESGR should consider the implications of the expanded role being advocated for reservists and expand its field programs to include this new topic.

### **I. Provide Incentives for Volunteering**

Although the success of reserve volunteerism depends entirely on the willingness of reservists to volunteer for active duty, there are few incentives available to encourage them to do that. Reliance is placed on patriotism, adventure, unit cohesion, and morale to induce reservists to leave their families and jobs for weeks or months, and this is sufficient for many of them. However, there are many disincentives for reserve volunteers. As previously noted, they can expect to have problems with pay, promotion, re-employment, income, jobs, and families. They are sometimes subjected to ridicule and condescending attitudes by the active troops they have volunteered to help. To counter these disincentives, there are few positive rewards other than the knowledge of a job well done.

The reservists interviewed for this study did not want promises of great financial reward or preferential treatment to induce them to volunteer. Most of them volunteered because they believed it was their duty to do so.<sup>2</sup> They did want to be treated fairly, as equals to their active duty counterparts.

DoD should establish appropriate incentives for reserve volunteers, particularly by providing recognition for their service. These measures could include the following:

- Annotation of personnel records to indicate periods of voluntary active duty service.
- Inclusion of remarks in efficiency or performance ratings that the individual has served voluntarily on active duty.
- Award of patches or badges for members of designated volunteer units who have volunteered to go on active duty when called.
- Establishment of a Reserve Components Voluntary Service Medal to be awarded to reservists who have served voluntarily on active duty in excess of a specified time period.
- Education and indoctrination of active duty personnel on the value and contribution made by reservists in general and reserve volunteers in particular so that reserve volunteers will be greeted with appreciation instead of derision.

### **C. THE FUTURE OF RESERVE VOLUNTEERISM**

In an era of continuing demands for military forces and declining funds for active forces, it is likely that frequent use will be made of National Guard and Reserve units and individuals. While reserve units and individuals will be accessed involuntarily for major regional contingencies and most lesser contingencies, and some operations other than war, there will be many military operations for which involuntary callup authority will not be requested. Reserve participation in domestic operations, most operations other than war, and some lesser contingencies will depend on the willingness of reservists to volunteer for active duty. This dependence on reserve volunteerism is a relatively new phenomenon, and many current policies, procedures, and attitudes are inappropriate to sustain it.

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<sup>2</sup> One member of the 238th Quartermaster Supply Company—a veteran senior NCO respected by all of the unit members—refused to volunteer because he believed it was the duty of the President to order him to active duty if the unit was needed. If the unit goes, however, this sergeant would go also, volunteer or not.

Recent experience indicates that many reservists are willing to volunteer for active duty to support operational missions. When reserve volunteers have been solicited, enough have answered the call to meet the operational requirements. The ease with which these volunteers have been accessed and employed varies by service, but an aura of confusion and self-imposed difficulties pervades the use of reserve volunteers. The purpose of this report is to clear up some of the confusion and suggest actions to eliminate or diminish the impact of some of the difficulties. The reserve volunteers are there, and it is up to the leaders of DoD and the military services to treat them well and make good use of them.

The value of the Reserve Components to the nation depends not only on their readiness to augment the active components for major wars, but also on their ability to assist in the many smaller operations that occur frequently. The Reserve Components have capabilities that either do not exist or are in short supply in the Active Components. The Reserve Components have the capability to provide temporary relief for over-committed active component forces. The way to obtain these capabilities for day-to-day operations is to prescribe policies, establish procedures, and encourage attitudes designed to facilitate reserve volunteerism and increase the willingness of reservists to volunteer for active duty.

## **APPENDIX**



## **PERSONS INTERVIEWED FOR THE REPORT**

The names of persons interviewed in person or on the telephone to provide information for this report are listed below. For the most part, the individuals are listed with the positions they held at the time of the events about which they were interviewed.

### **OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense

Christopher Jehn, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel

David Addington, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Lieutenant General John B. Conaway, Chief, National Guard Bureau

Major General William A. Navas, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs

Major General Robert A. Goodbary, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) for Readiness, Training, and Manpower

Mr. Joel Resnick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) for Strategic Policy and Planning

Mr. Frank Rush, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) for Reserve Personnel

Colonel Dennis Barlow, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

Colonel Nick Dawson, National Ombudsman, National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve

Colonel Paul Knox, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

Colonel David McGinnis, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

Colonel Frederick C. Oelrich, Professor, Industrial College of the Armed Forces

Colonel Steve Strom, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Requirements, and Resources

Colonel Audrey Wilczek, Deputy Director, National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve

Lieutenant Commander Mark Garrow, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I

## **THE JOINT STAFF**

General Colin L. Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Lieutenant General Walter Kross, Director, Joint Staff

Rear Admiral Patricia A. Tracey, Director of Manpower and Personnel, J-1

Colonel Glenn O. Cassidy, Mobilization Division, Directorate for Logistics, J-4

Colonel Jeff Freeland, Mobilization Division, Directorate for Logistics, J-4

Colonel John Gooch, Mobilization Division, Directorate for Logistics, J-4

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Bultmeier, Mobilization Division, Directorate for Logistics, J-4

Commander Mary Gleason, Directorate of Manpower and Personnel, J-1

Lieutenant Colonel John Odell, Mobilization Division, Directorate for Logistics, J-4

## **HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND**

Major General Michael Byron, Director, Plans and Policy, J-5

Major General Nathaniel H. Robb, Deputy CINC for Mobilization and Reserve Affairs

Rear Admiral Timothy O. Fanning, Chief of Staff

Colonel Todd Beurnham, Senior ANG Advisor

Lieutenant Colonel Steve Reynolds, Directorate for Manpower and Personnel, J-1

Commander John Kittler, Directorate for Operations, J-3

## **HEADQUARTERS, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND**

Lieutenant Colonel Dan Knapik, Directorate for Personnel and Manpower, J-1

Major E. F. Sutton, Directorate for Plans and Policy, J-5

## **DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff

G. Kim Wincup, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs

William D. Clark, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs

General Edwin H. Burba, Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command

Lieutenant General William H. Reno, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Major General John R D'Araujo, Director, Army National Guard

Major General Max Baratz, Chief, Army Reserve

Major General Don Campbell, Commander, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command

Major General Joseph Kinzer, Director of Operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

Brigadier General Bruce Bingham, Commander, 350th Civil Affairs Brigade

E. B. Vandiver, III, Director, Army Concepts Analysis Agency

Colonel James Adams, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

Colonel Roy Alcala, Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff

Colonel Karl Lowe, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

Colonel Anthony Roszka, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

Colonel Michael Squier, Chief, Readiness Division, Army National Guard

Colonel Morris Wood, National Guard Bureau

Raymond Robinson, Mobilization Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Brown, Mobilization Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Lieutenant Colonel A.C. Channels, Army National Guard Operations Center

Lieutenant Colonel Ron Johnson, Army National Guard Operations Center

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph C. Kulbok, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs

Lieutenant Colonel Rusty Miller, Mobilization Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

Lieutenant Colonel Dave Piet, Operations Directorate, U.S. Army Forces Command

Lieutenant Colonel Cal B. Riley, Office, Chief, Army Reserve

Lieutenant Colonel Kass Saleh, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army Special Operations Command

Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command: Mr. James Kerr, Force Integration Division; Mr. Jim Steinbach and Mr. Jeff Wetjen, Operations Directorate, Mr. Gene Carpenter, Logistics Directorate, Command Sergeant Major Prather, USAR, and Command Sergeant Major Bennett, ARNG

Headquarters, U.S. Army Reserve Command: Mr. Carl Taylor, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Lieutenant Colonel Chandler Stone, and Lieutenant Colonel Doug Martz

National Guard Bureau: Lieutenant Colonel Forest L. Ramsey, Lieutenant Colonel Howard E. Mayhew, and Major George Villary, Military Support Office: Mr. John Kutcher, Operations Office; Mr. Randall C. Stephens, NGB Judge Advocate Office.

U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command: Colonel Richard Hayford, Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Camp, Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Healy, and Command Sergeant Major Steven Foust

U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command: Colonel Kent Chrosniak, James Emery, Charles Fish, and Karen Farren

#### **DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**

General Robert D. Russ, Commander, Tactical Air Command

Major General John J. Closner, Chief, Air Force Reserve

Major General Donald W. Shepperd, Director, Air National Guard

Major General Michael S. Hall, Commander, 174th Tactical Fighter Wing

Colonel Gerald D. Ball, Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Reserve Affairs

#### **DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY**

Wade R. Sanders, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Reserve Affairs

Rear Admiral T. F. Hall, Director of Naval Reserve

Brigadier General R. G. Richard, Assistant Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs for Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, USMC

Captain Dave Grupe, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Reserve Affairs

Captain Thomas L. Jones, Director, Legislative and Information Management Division, Office of the Director of Naval Reserve

Captain Thomas L. Parke

Commander Katherine M. Goldstein, Head, Mobilization Plans Branch, Office of the Director of Naval Reserve

Commander Arlow Lippert, Total Force Programming and Manpower Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel

Milton Eugene Arnold, Mobilization Plans and Policy Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel

Lieutenant Kurth, Military Personnel Policy and Career Progression Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel

#### **THE 711TH POSTAL COMPANY**

Major General John D'Araujo, Director, Army National Guard

Colonel Al Keener, Office of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army

Major Nina Garcia, DA Staff Postal Officer

U.S. Army Reserve Command: LTC Doug Martz, ODSCOPS; Ms. Sandy Smith, Chief, Administrative Policy and Services Division, ODCSIM; Kenneth W. Davis, Official USARC Mail Manager, and Edward Demetsky, Postal Branch, ODCSIM

James Hunter, ODSCOPS, 81st ARCOM

David Presley, 3320th US Army Garrison

834th AG Company (Postal): Captain Jim Horey, Commander; First Sergeant Bob Sullivan

Directorate of Reserve Component Support, Fort Bragg, NC: Earl Hudgens, Deputy Director; Lieutenant Colonel Tom Bedient, Mobilization Plans Officer; Ms. Cathy Patterson, Mobilization Specialist

Colonel Thomas H. Davis, Chief, Readiness Group Bragg

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Hardesty, G-1, 10th Mountain Division

Joint Task Force Support Command, Somalia: Brigadier General Billy K. Solomon, Commander; Captain Jason T. Evans, G-1.

Captain David Papas, Commander, 43th Postal Detachment (Provisional)

711th AG Company (Postal): Captain Tamara Dozier, Commander; First Lieutenant Lee J. Perkins, Executive Officer

### **THE U.S. ARMY ELEMENT OF THE MFO MISSION, SINAI**

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph C. Kulbok, OASA(M&RA)

Lieutenant Colonel Wm D. Hewitt, DAMO-OD

Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Brumley, Project Officer, Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command

Army National Guard: Colonel Michael J. Squier, Chief, Readiness Division; Major Robert A. Martinez, NGB MFO Project Officer

29th Infantry Division, National Guard: Colonel Dean Schroyer, Chief of Staff; Captain Paul Smith, Assistant G-1 and MFO Project Officer, Financial Management

Dr. Ruth Phelps, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral Sciences, Boise, ID

Dr. David Segal, Professor of Sociology, University of Maryland

### **THE 670TH MILITARY POLICE COMPANY**

Lieutenant Colonel Walter Young, ARNG Operations Division

Fort Drum: Lieutenant Colonel Larry A. Porter, Director of Reserve Components Support; Lieutenant Colonel Larry Holliday, Mobilization Division; Major David W. Haywood, Acting Provost Marshal; Master Sergeant Thomas P. Darras II, ARNG Operations and Training NCO

670th Military Police Company: Captain Wayne C. Brown, Commander; First Lieutenant Bradley Rossmiller, Executive Officer, First Sergeant Lee E. Lindley; five NCOs, and about twenty other unit members.

#### **THE 175TH FIGHTER GROUP, MARYLAND NATIONAL GUARD**

Lieutenant Colonel William Saunders, ODASAF (Reserve Affairs)

175th Fighter Group: Colonel Bruce F. Tuxill, Coniniander; Colonel Walter T. Thilly, Rainbow Detachment Commander; Major Michael Theisen, Project Officer

#### **THE 258TH QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY COMPANY**

Lieutenant Colonel Walter Young, ARNG Operations Division

232nd Corps Support Battalion, Illinois National Guard: Lieutenant Colonel Henry Kusel, Commander; Major Ron Morrow, Executive Officer

238th Quartermaster Supply Company: Captain Chris Lawson, Commander; First Lieutenant Mike Cima, Executive Officer; First Sergeant Al Rogers; and 15 enlisted personnel in grades E-3 to E-5

#### **E COMPANY 25TH MARINE REGIMENT**

Colonel J. C. Hardee, Chief of Staff, 2nd Marine Division

25th Marines: Colonel Kevin A. Conry, Commander; Lieutenant Colonel Jere Carroll, Commander, 2nd Battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Steve Swift, 2nd Battalion I&I; and other mentbers of the Regimental Staff

E Company, 25th Marines: Captain Brian Sulc, Commander; Captain Frank Topley, E Company I&I; First Sergeant Joe Kundrat; HM3 Jeffrey Powell, and about 30 enlisted members of E Company

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

## ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Active Component
AG	Adjutant General
CFP	Contingency Force Pool
CINC	commanders in chief
CONUS	continental United States
DoD	Department of Defense
DRCS	Directorate of Reserve Component Support
FORSCOM	Forces Command
IDA	Institute for Defense Analyses
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentee
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
MOS	military occupational specialty
MP	military police
MRC	major regional contingency
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCESGR	National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operations
OOTW	operations other than war
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PSRC	Presidential Selected Reserve Callup
QM	Quartermaster
RC	Reserve Component
USARC	United States Army Reserve Command

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